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The Contested Terrain of Central Banking: 
Ideas, Interests and the Class Politics of Canadian Monetary Policy, 1975-1991 
 
By Matthew Brett 
 
Monetary policy in Canada underwent significant changes between 1975 and 1991 as the central 
bank shifted from fostering full employment to aggressively reducing and controlling inflation. 
Existing studies of this period largely adopt either monetarist or constructivist frameworks of 
analysis. Both of these approaches do not sufficiently account for the class-based dynamics of 
monetary policy. Adopting Epstein’s view that central banks are contested terrains in which 
conflicting interests compete for profit and power over the marcroeconomy (2001), this paper 
examines the class-based dimensions of monetary policy change. The framework developed in 
this study accounts for both systemic factors of capital accumulation and class dynamics that 
influence monetary policy. Three distinct yet overlapping periods are analysed: the monetarist 
period (1975-82); the Volcker Shock period (1977-84); and the Crow Doctrine period (1988-91). 
Each of these periods had a distinct configuration of class forces, and these shifting 
configurations influenced the monetary ideas and policies that prevailed during a given time. 
Organized labour was significantly weakened during the monetarist and Volcker periods, while 
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Canada is said to have emerged relatively unscathed from the global recession that began 
in 2007. Such was the confidence of the Conservative majority government that they could 
position Canada as an international leader at the 2012 World Economic Forum in Davos, 
Switzerland. Prime Minister Stephen Harper said that “Canada’s choice will be, with clarity and 
urgency, to seize and to master our future, to be a model of confidence, growth, and prosperity in 
the 21st century” (PMO, 2012). Others have painted a less optimistic portrait of the Canadian 
economy.  
The International Monetary Fund’s 2012 annual report on Canada warned of significant 
job losses, housing price declines and protracted low household consumption levels stemming 
from record levels of household debt (Lam, 2012). “Make no mistake, such a combination of 
forces would likely cause a recession,” said Craig Alexander, chief economist with TD Bank 
(ibid). In order to understand the present conditions of the Canadian economy, it is necessary to 
extend analysis well beyond the crisis of 2007.  
Certainly, the crisis has played a critical role in shaping recent political and economic 
conditions in Canada, as the state was required to inject massive amounts of liquidity in order to 
pull the Canadian economy out of a recession (Lavoie and Seccareccia, 2009). Subsequent 
austerity measures at provincial and federal levels continue to have far-reaching consequences, 
and the broader restructuring of global trade following the crisis will have lasting implications 
for Canada (Bradford, Colin 2011). Yet the present volatility of Canada’s economy should not 
simply be regarded as stemming from the global crisis of 2007. 
This volatility emerged over time both globally and domestically because of significant 





(Baragar and Seccareccia, 2008; Seccareccia, 2007). The Canadian state began to impose sharp 
monetary, fiscal and regulatory restraint in the mid-1970s, and while these policies were 
intended to reduce the rate of inflation and decrease levels of public sector debt, they also served 
to increase levels of inequality, unemployment and household debt (Sears, 1999). Therefore, in 
order to understand the present circumstances in Canada, it is necessary to understand what has 
occurred since the 1970s. 
A critical aspect of this story is the role of monetary policy. The Bank of Canada, the 
nation’s central bank, has played a vital role in the Canadian economy since it was established 
after World War II. Historically, central bank policy was focused upon achieving stable rates of 
growth and full levels of employment. Presenting his White Paper on Employment and Income to 
Parliament in 1944, for example, Federal Reconstruction Minister C.D. Howe emphasized the 
need for a “high and stable level of employment and income” (cited in Babad, 1995: 58). But just 
40 years after this statement, unemployment levels were reaching unprecedented levels and the 
state was fostering a national recession in order to quell inflation. The central bank has radically 
shifted its policies from fostering full employment to an almost single-minded focus on obtaining 
a stable rate of inflation. 
This paper is about Canadian monetary policy and the immense class struggles waged 
around these policies between 1975 and 1991. At the root of this study is the following question: 
why did the Bank of Canada reorient its monetary policy between the 1970s and 1990s? 
Answering this question is critically important, as a clear understanding of monetary policy will 
help explain the contemporary conditions of Canada’s political economy. Record levels of 
household debt and inequality pose serious risks for the Canadian economy, according to the 





Another central purpose of this paper is to challenge conventional narratives of this 
period in monetary policy history. As I argue more substantively in Chapter 1, existing accounts 
of this period overlook some important considerations. These oversights and omissions foster 
partial or inaccurate understandings of Canadian monetary policy and contemporary economic 
conditions. There is a need to critically appraise prevalent narratives in order to insure that 
alternative theories are considered. 
Monetarism and constructivism serve as two prevalent approaches to the study of 
Canadian monetary policy during the 1970s and into the 1990s. Monetarists suggest that the 
Bank of Canada had no choice but to tackle inflation in the 1970s and 80s. The excesses of 
Keynesian welfare state intervention and expansionary monetary policy spurred inflation, so the 
monetarist argument goes. The state must therefore take a less interventionist stance in order for 
inflation rates to decrease. This monetarist account was all-pervasive in economic and policy 
literature of the 1970s and 80s, yet it completely overlooked key factors. Namely, monetarist 
accounts evade the political and societal implications of their analysis and theory altogether. 
Monetarist economists present their arguments as scientifically verifiable and politically benign. 
Yet, as I argue below, the political and social content and ramifications of their work is clear. 
An alternative approach to this period emphasizes the role of economic ideas in shaping 
policy outcomes. This constructivist approach emerged in the 1990s and continues to evolve 
rapidly. A core component of the constructivist school is its emphasis upon the role of ideas in 
explaining policy change. Constructivists generally situate their theories in relation to realist or 
structuralist arguments, which emphasize distributions of political and economic power. By 
emphasizing the importance of ideas instead of power, constructivists have developed unique 
explanations about why certain policies and ideas prevail over others (Blyth, 1997; 2001; 2003; 





One of the central arguments made by constructivist scholars is that the 1970s and 80s 
marked a profound shift in economic thinking. Prevailing Keynesian ideas of the 1950s and 60s 
gave way to neoliberal ideology, with its emphasis on free markets and free capital flows. This 
line of argument has gained a strong degree of salience when applied to studies of Canadian 
monetary policy. Political scientist Timothy Lewis, for example, argues that… 
developments in economic theory brought Keynesian notions of sound macroeconomic 
policy under increasing challenge across industrialized nations, including Canada. The 
acceptance of these theoretical changes in bureaucracies often required political 
sponsorship to be fully expressed. (2003: 4) 
With respect to the conduct of monetary policy, this meant a shift away from Keynsian 
ideas of full employment toward a newfound emphasis upon inflation rate reduction and control. 
While neoclassical accounts neglect the political content of monetary policy outright, most 
constructivist scholarship also does not sufficiently engage with political content of monetary 
policy change. By emphasising the role of economic ideas, constructivists effectively downplay 
the political and class-based interests embedded in these ideas. As Bieler and Morton argue, 
constructivists do not adequately “address the question as to why a certain set of ideas, rooted 
within […] material relations, dominates at a particular point in time” (2008: 123). 
It is my contention that both neoclassical and constructivist accounts do not adequately 
explain why the Bank of Canada sought to aggressively tackle inflation between 1975 and 1991. 
This is a particularly important weakness within much of the constructivist literature, given that 
this approach is gaining traction within the field of political economy. Emphasising the role of 
ideas without sufficiently accounting for the interests embedded in these ideas is problematic and 





Placing central emphasis upon class interests instead of ideas requires an alternative to 
monetarist and constructivist frameworks. In Chapter 2, I present a theoretical framework which 
places greater emphasis upon class struggle and the structural dynamics of capital accumulation. 
Drawing largely from Marxist scholarship and the Parisian regulation school in particular 
(Jessop, 1997), this theoretical framework accounts for both structural and agency-based factors 
that influence which monetary ideas and policies prevail in a given time and place. 
The Parisian regulation school holds that “economic activities are socially embedded and 
socially regularized and that stable economic expansion depends on specific social modes of 
economic regulation that complement the role of market forces in guiding capitalist 
development” (Jessop, 2008: 24). Regulationists emphasize the crisis-tendencies of capital, 
stressing that capital is unstable and subject to change. The nature of the crisis and its subsequent 
evolution are mediated by class struggle and broader social forces (Jessop, 1997).  More recent 
regulationist literature has moved away from an overt focus on the national state to emphasize 
the uneven spatial and scalar dynamics of capital accumulation. Greater attempts have also been 
made to move away from a strict emphasis upon capital to be more inclusive of other 
institutional orders such as the state, media, law, science, civil society and so on (ibid: 507-8). 
Integreated with this regulationist approach is a somewhat nuanced understanding of class 
configurations and class struggle, drawing largely from the ideas of a “power bloc” put forward 
by Mahon (1977).  
The basic line of argument runs as follows: at the structural level, capital has an innate 
tendency to go through cycles of boom and bust. At the agency-based level, capital divides 
society into evolving class configurations and organizational forms, and these organizational 





this way, the radical shift in monetary policy between 1975 and 1991 was the result of a 
significant restructuring in national and global capital and class forces.  
With respect to monetary policy, a structural crisis of capitalism threw the global 
economy into a deep recession in the early 1970s, and this crisis opened a window of opportunity 
for class forces to reconfigure global capital. Monetary policy became a contested terrain of class 
struggle as competing interests sought to shape policy to suit particular interests. The Keynesian 
model that prevailed in the immediate post-war era benefited broad segments of society as the 
central bank sought to maintain levels of full employment. The systemic crisis of capital that 
emerged in the 1970s brought Keynesian monetary policy into question, as vested interests 
sought to undermine existing monetary policies.  
At the same time, the organizational form of global capital was becoming increasingly 
finanicalized following the demise of the Bretton Woods system in 1971. The abandonment of 
the gold standard allowed speculators to invest in national currencies, and investors invariably 
searched for currencies that provided the highest yield. This shift from broadly Keynesian to 
neoliberal organizational forms played a disciplinary function upon national governments and 
central banks, as speculators emerged as critical players within the power bloc, given that they 
were free to shift investments to currencies that provided the highest return on investment. 
Monetary policy served as a central component in the shift from Keynesianism to 
neoliberalism. With Keynesian monetary policies effectively undermined, the Bank of Canada 
introduced a series of policies that targeted inflation rather than employment, finally adopting a 
policy of “inflation targeting” that remains in place today. As Epstein argues, the main effect of 
this policy has been to increase the share of profits going to financial and speculative interests 
(2002). The shift from broadly Keynesian monetary policy to its neoliberal variant can therefore 





Emphasising the class dynamics of monetary policy and policy change stands in contrast 
with both monetarist and constructivist accounts. The approach adopted in this study brings class 
struggle and economic interests to the forefront of analysis. Struggles over inflation control and 
inflation targeting regimes were not simply struggles over economic ideas and theories. These 
were struggles waged by competing class interests in an effort to gain an increasing share of 
profits and power over the macroeconomy. Economic ideas simply served as tools for competing 
class forces to achieve their desired policy ends. 
Historical Context 
While inflation in Canada could be attributed to a number of factors, this study isolates 
two principal sources of inflationary pressure in Canadian economy. First, as I will argue in 
Chapter 2, capitalism has an innate tendency to go through cyclical waves of boom and bust. 
This capital accumulation cycle reached its expansionary height, I argue, in the late-1960s both 
in Canada and on a global scale. Rapid capital accumulation along these lines fostered a 
significant increase in the rate of inflation. Secondly, a key moment specifically related to the 
Canadian case was the unpegging of the Canadian dollar to the U.S. greenback in 1971 
(Helleiner and Momani, 2010). The Canadian dollar was briefly pegged at a fixed exchange rate 
to the American dollar from 1962 to 1970. With this peg abandoned in 1971, Canadian currency 
began to appreciate rapidly. Policy-makers were reluctant to allow the exchange rate to 
appreciate too substantively, as this would likely slow economic growth due to uncompetitive 
pricing of Canadian commodities. Thus, the Bank of Canada pursued expansionary monetary 
policies in the early 1970s as a means of insuring near parity with the U.S. dollar (Helleiner, 
2005). Monetarists in particular argue that this served as a major root of inflationary build-up in 





Both the appreciation of the Canadian dollar and this expansionary phase of the global 
accumulation cycle caused inflation to reach record levels. Policy-makers therefore gradually 
began to shift their attention away from fostering full employment and toward reducing the rate 
of inflation. The manner in which this policy-transition occurred was not a politically benign 
process, however. As I argue more substantively in Chapter 3, vested interests fostered this 
change in monetary thinking in order to achieve their own class interests. More specifically, 
advocates of free market capitalism worked to delegitimize prevailing Keynesian policies in 
favour of their monetarist counterparts as a means of gaining a greater share of national profits 
and power over the macroeconomy. 
This shift in the conduct of monetary policy can be broken into three fairly distinct yet 
overlapping stages. It is useful to break the history of Canadian monetary policy into stages as a 
means of identifying what changes occurred with respect to monetary policy over time. These 
specific periods were isolated because they marked particularly turbulent moments in Canadian 
monetary policy history: the first period (1975-82) began with the adoption of broadly monetarist 
policies in 1975 and closed with the abandonment of these policies in 1981; the second and third 
periods (1977-84; 1988-91) were moments of sustained high interest rates that were unparalleled 
in Canadian history. These three phases will be addressed substantively in Chapter 3, but a brief 
overview is provided here in order to contexualize this study. 
The	Monetarist	Era,	1975‐82 
In order to understand the nature and content of monetary policy, it is first necessary to 
understand the prevailing organizational from of global and national capital. This organizational 
form adhered to broadly Keynesian principles in the early 1970s, as the Canadian post-war 





achieve levels of full employment. This Keynesian organizational form began to erode under 
pressures of outsourcing and globalization, with the OPEC crisis serving to significantly alter the 
prevailing organizational form (Barsky and Kilian, 2004). The global crisis therefore served as a 
catalyst for change, with various class powers exerting their influence in order to reconfigure 
global and national capital in their interest. 
Monetarist policy prescriptions served as a critical lever to quell the strength of organized 
labour in the 1970s. Recognizing the class-dimensions of monetarism, significant struggles were 
waged within executive levels of government in an attempt to prevent the introduction of 
monetarist policy. Liberal Finance Minister John Turner, for example, opposed his own 
government’s policy and stated in his 1975 budget speech that he rejected monetarist policies 
outright (cited in Crow, 2009: 3).Organized labour also reached its most militant level in 
Canadian history during this time, as the level of strike and lockout activity reached its peak 
during this period. As I argue in Chapter 3, there is substantial evidence from primary records 
that the state recognized the power of organized labour and worked to weaken these “market 
rigidities” as a means of achieving their anti-inflation objectives. Monetarist policies were 
nevertheless adopted and Minister Turner resigned, marking a critical turning point in Canadian 
monetary policy history. The central bank had effectively abandoned its mandate to foster full 
levels of employment, focusing instead on reducing the monetary supply as a means of quelling 
inflation. 
This first period marked a decisive turning point away from broadly Keynesian monetary 
policy toward a neoliberal variant. Whereas constructivist accounts of this period emphasize a 
shift in economic ideas away from Keynesianism toward a monetarist counterpart, I argue that 
this period marked a reconfiguration of class power within the state and society. The monetarist 





restraints on the monetary supply slowed the economy to the point of recession in 1981. Unlike 
the prosperous time that had prevailed in the immediate post-war environment, the weak national 
economy of the 1970s disempowered organized labour. These monetary policies were coupled 
with fiscal restraint, regulatory reform and sharp wage and price controls. Yet, despite this first 
period of austerity, it would take another two waves of anti-inflationary policy in order for the 
state to achieve its objectives of low and stable inflation. 
Ripple	Effects:	The	Volcker	Shock	in	Canada,	1977‐84	
Just as Keynesian ideas were undermined by monetarist alternatives, monetarism itself 
was undermined in the late 1970s. The policy-prescriptions offered by monetarists were failing 
to achieve their objectives of reducing inflation, and the monetarist turn was officially abandoned 
in 1982. New monetary ideas therefore came to replace monetarist doctrine. Rather than focusing 
on reducing the money supply, the Bank of Canada sought to increase interest rates to whatever 
level was necessary in order to curb inflation. This policy was initiated by the Federal Reserve 
Chairman in the United States, Paul Volcker, in an era that is referred to among critical circles as 
the Volcker Shock (Bond, 2008). 
One of the distinguishing features of this period was the reconfiguration of global and 
national capital that had occurred. As I argue in detail in Chapter 2, the organizational form of 
global and national capital had changed significantly since the early 1970s. Abandoning the gold 
standard in 1971 allowed speculators to invest in national currencies across the world. This 
reconfiguration of the prevailing organizational form accorded significant power to institutional 
and private investors, as speculative capital could now flow easily across countries and markets. 
Investors could signal their discontent or pleasure with national policies by shifting their 





late 1970s in Canada, as investors withdrew their money to signal that the central bank and the 
elected government was not reducing inflation rates rapidly enough. The elected government 
responded in 1978 by sending a clear signal to markets that inflation would become their primary 
concern. Class struggle had shifted away from traditional worker-owner relations to a struggle 




 The final wave of monetary restraint was somewhat unique to Canada. Incoming Bank of 
Canada Governor John Crow set out to tackle inflation by again raising interest rates to whatever 
level was necessary to curb inflation in what is now referred to as the Crow Doctrine (Babad, 
1995). Interest rates imposed during this period reached levels not matched in Canadian history. 
Unlike during the Volcker era, organized opposition to the Crow Doctrine was immediate and 
widespread. Corporate interests, mainstream media, a broad cross-section of private and public 
sector unions, households and farmers actively opposed Governor Crow’s policies from the start. 
Crow was nevertheless shielded by a legal entitlement known as Central Bank 
Independence (CBI). CBI grants central bank managers the privilege of pursuing their policy 
objectives without interference from the elected government or democratic forces. It is standard 
practice in Canada that the Bank Governor has ultimate discretion over monetary policy, but the 
elected government can intervene in monetary policy. Should this occur, it is unwritten 
convention that the Bank of Canada Governor resign from his or her post. The relative autonomy 






The distinguishing feature of this period is the extent to which Governor Crow was 
shielded from class pressure. Provincial Premiers went so far as to demand that the government 
intervene in monetary policy, which would have invariably forced the governor to resign. Crow 
was able to maintain his position and policies because, as Crow himself argued, Progressive 
Conservative Finance Minister Michael Wilson was “fundamentally supportive of the clear anti-
inflationary stance taken, because he thought that this was the way the world was going, and also 
the way it needed to go” (Crow, 2009: 7). The Governor therefore relied critically upon support 
from the elected government in order to impose this third and final wave of monetary restraint. 
The account developed in this study places class and class struggle at the centre of 
analysis. Looked at in this way, the prevailing economic ideas of a given time are expressions of 
particular class interests. Monetarism, inflation-rate control and inflation-rate targeting may 
indeed represent three distinct monetary policies and economic ideas, but these ideas and policies 
are bound by their common support and active promotion from particular class interests. 
Moreover, the organizational form of global and national capital does influence the nature of 
class struggle and the relative power of combatants. Tightly regulated post-war economies 
granted substantial power to organized labour, but the erosion of this organizational form 
through processes of outsourcing, globalization and regulatory reform effectively increased the 
class power of financial interests. The contested terrain of central banking is a critical space in 
which competing interests struggle for profits and power over the macroeconomy. 
This study is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 provides a critical review of the 
monetarist and constructivist literature. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework utilized in 
this study. An analysis of Canadian monetary policy during the 1970s and into the 1990s is 









 Scholarship on the Bank of Canada’s fight against inflation is extensive and expanding. 
Despite the widespread scrutiny of this period, two opposing interpretations emerged by the 
1990s that retain a strong degree of salience within the academic literature today: monetarist and 
constructivist approaches. Indeed, elements of the monetarist approach remain central to 
neoclassical interpretations of monetary events. As I argue below, one critical weakness is that 
monetarists largely present their work as neutral or scientific. Monetarist literature is simply not 
realistic in this sense, as monetary theory and policy are permeated to the core with political 
substance. The omission of politics from economic analysis remains a critical oversight within 
the monetarist literature. 
Conversely, the alternative constructivist approach does account for the political 
substance of monetary policy. The de-legitimization of Keynesian ideas required active political 
agency, which neoclassical economists, politicians and advocates provided. Two factors are 
nevertheless insufficiently accounted for in constructivist accounts of the 1970s and 1980s. First, 
a systemic economic crisis took place within the global political economy of the early 1970s. 
This global crisis had a profound impact upon the conduct of Canadian political and economic 
affairs. This structural factor is treated as a secondary component of analysis within the 
constructivist literature. 
Secondly, coupled with this systemic crisis was the emergence of widespread class 
struggle in Canada, the United States and Britain. This global crisis and the ensuing class 
struggles fundamentally altered the dynamics of the Canadian state, including the conduct of 
monetary policy. These class struggles are not analyzed with sufficient detail in the constructivist 





address the question of why the Bank of Canada adopted sharp anti-inflationary policies 
throughout the 1970s and into the 1990s. These systemic and class-based dynamics must be 
more thoroughly integrated into analyses of Canadian monetary policy.  
This review begins by detailing the monetarist literature and its treatment of Canadian 
monetary policy in the 1970s and 80s. Critiques of the monetarist literature are then more fully 
developed. The constructivist literature is then presented, followed by a critique. The chapter 
concludes by introducing Marxian theory as the most appropriate framework to address the 
shortcomings and oversights identified within the monetarist and constructivist literature. 
The	Theory	and	Practice	of	Canadian	Monetarism	
Monetarist theory came into fruition in the early 1960s, but it would take a particular 
confluence of events for monetarism to take hold in Canada. As detailed in the introduction, the 
unpegging of the Canadian dollar from the U.S. greenback in 1971 provided monetarists with the 
pretext for rolling out their theories and policy proposals. The Bank of Canada was concerned 
that the increasing value of the dollar would harm the economy, so it expanded the monetary 
supply in order to slow the appreciation of the dollar. Monetarists were well positioned in this 
respect. Their central theoretical claim was that inflation is always a monetary phenomenon 
caused by an “activist” or interventionist central bank. Monetarists could suddenly validate their 
theory by pointing to the Bank’s expansionary monetary policy response to the appreciating 
dollar. Indeed, Canadian economist Thomas Courchene argued that “the net result of attempting 
to obtain an ‘appropriate’ exchange rate was a very large increase in the rate of monetary 
expansion, the legacy of which is our current inflation rate” (1976: 161). Inflation, it appeared, 





The central argument adopted by monetarists was that inflation was caused by an overly 
interventionist central bank and government. This position is held with strong consistency within 
the literature. For example, Howitt argued that inflation had been correlated with the rate of 
growth in the national monetary supply since 1960, and that monetary expansion in Canada was 
excessive throughout the 1970s (1986: 11). Even in 1993, long after monetarist policy principles 
were abandoned, Laidler and Robson argued that growth rates of monetary aggregates “can and 
should serve as central indicators and perhaps as targets for the Bank of Canada” (1993: 3). The 
salience of monetarist ideas remains strong within the neoclassical cannon. 
If, according to monetarists, inflation was caused by excessive monetary expansion, it 
followed that anti-inflationary measures must entail a reduction in the monetary supply. 
Monetarists of  the 1970s would demand that the Bank of Canada tighten the monetary supply, 
and they would then scold the central bank when it failed to reduce the money supply to levels 
they deemed appropriate (Courchene, 1976; Howitt, 1986). Their intervention was consistent and 
forceful to the degree that its adherents may have been the first to use British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher’s famous slogan, “there is no alternative.” Couchene argued that “the simple 
truth is that if Canada is at all serious about reversing the current inflationary trend, there is no 
alternative to ensuring that monetary growth rates fall to more appropriate levels” (my italics, 
1976: 235). 
Research by monetarists at private think-tanks and public universities then began to 
influence the Bank of Canada itself. Former Bank Governor John Crow, who worked as a senior 
official at the Bank in the mid-1970s, said that the Bank had commissioned research on monetary 
targeting “in response to the burgeoning academic literature [on monetarism]” (2009: 3). Not 
only was a growing body of monetarist literature emerging in the 1970s, the former Governor 





the early 1970s (ibid). This newfound emphasis upon monetarist theory within the Bank’s 
research department gradually filtered into the Bank’s actual policy practices, and by 1975, 
senior Bank officials were clearly espousing monetarist principles. For example, in an address to 
the Canadian Life Insurance Association in 1975, Bank Governor Gerald Bouey explained the 
principal causes of inflation in the following manner: 
The short answer is that it was caused by the over-expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies pursued by almost all of the world’s industrialized countries in the early 1970s. 
These policies had been invoked in an effort to restore high levels of output and 
employment following the economic slowdown at the beginning of the decade […] I 
doubt whether it is generally appreciated how important a factor this was in laying the 
foundations for the worst outbreak of inflation of the postwar period.” (Cited in 
Courchene, 1976: 229) 
Monetarism unequivocally went from theory to practice with Governor Bouey’s 
“Saskatoon Manifesto” speech to the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in 1975. During the 
speech, Bouey stated that “whatever else may need to be done to bring inflation under control, it 
is absolutely essential to keep the rate of monetary expansion within reasonable limits” (cited in 
Crow, 2009: 3). This placed monetary policy as a central pillar in the fight against inflation, 
which was coupled with fiscal wage and price controls introduced shortly thereafter. Courchene 
captured the “philosophical conversion” which took place within the Bank very well: 
On Thanksgiving eve, 1975, the Canadian institutional fabric was effectively 
revolutionized with the imposition of wage and price controls. Only a few weeks earlier 
Governor Bouey delivered an address to the 46th Annual Meeting of the Canadian 
Chamber of Commerce in Saskatoon which represents a watershed in the annals of Bank 





combination of these events has, in effect, ushered in a new era of Canadian and 
monetary and financial policy. (Courchene, 1976: 278) 
Following the Manifesto speech, the Bank implemented a period of anti-inflationary 
monetary restraint known as “gradualism.” Gradualism, as the name suggests, entails a gradual 
tightening of the money supply in order to reduce inflation. This was achieved by gradually 
raising interest rates to reduce the demand for money. To monetarists, high interest rates were a 
necessary medicine for mitigating, and ultimately reversing, expansionary monetary policies of 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, targeting interest rates rather than monetary growth 
rates marked a deviation from strict monetarist principles, and monetarists were quick to point 
this discrepancy out (Howitt, 1986). Indeed, strict monetarist targeting theoretically entailed 
direct control of the supply of monetary reserves, but the Bank “never really believed in true 
monetary targeting” (Lavoie and Seccareccia, 2006: 45). Instead, the Bank estimated a predicted 
path of real income and prices and then set the interest level to effectively guide the demand for 
money (ibid: 45-6). Reducing the growth of monetary aggregates was to be conducted in a 
manner that would gradually bring inflation rates down within a specific target range of 8 per 
cent for the first year, 6 per cent in the second, and 4 per cent in the third (Crow, 2009). 
To summarize the monetarist position, expansionary monetary policy is regarded as the 
principal source of inflation. Inflationary pressures in Canada are attributed to an unpegging of 
the Canadian dollar and “activist” policies adopted by the central bank and the elected 
government. Inflation is almost entirely attributed to state intervention and activist monetary 
policy in particular. To mitigate these trends, monetarists argued that the central bank must 
reduce the monetary supply. And while the intellectual roots of monetarism emerged in the early 
1960s, it was only in 1975 that monetarist theory had taken sufficient hold of the intellectual 






A number of technical critiques of the monetarist position have crystalized in both the 
Canadian and international context (Brunhoff, 1982; Donner and Peters, 1979; Kaldor, 1982). 
The monetarist framework does indeed contain logical shortcomings along with problems of 
interpretation. Two particular critiques are developed in this section. First, monetarists argue that 
there is only a short-term trade-off between monetary restraint, rates of unemployment and 
growth. This claim is weak, if not outright false. A substantial body of literature has come to 
challenge it, yet variants of this theory are still applied to the conduct of Canadian monetary 
policy today. Second, monetarists interpret inflation strictly as the result of state intervention, 
and suggest restraint in monetary growth rates are a necessary remedy. Overlooking the validity 
of this assertion, there are important political positions inherent in this argument that are not 
sufficiently addressed within the monetarist literature. As I argue below, greater attention must 
therefore be paid to the ideological and political implications of monetary analysis. 
Regarding the first critique, monetarists hold that restraint in the monetary supply only 
effects economic growth and unemployment rates on a short-term basis. Howitt, for example, 
argues that “…over long periods of time, the rate of monetary expansion affects neither the rate 
of real output growth nor the rate of unemployment” (1986: 13). Laidler and Robson likewise 
hold that the economy’s unemployment rate is independent of inflation (1993: 12-13). They 
argue that the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment is only effected during transitional 
periods from higher to lower inflation rates (when unemployment is usually high), or from lower 
to higher rates of inflation (when unemployment is brought down). This position is a central 
component of monetarism, which holds that there is a natural unemployment rate to which the 





This position has come under vigorous criticism from a variety of perspectives, with 
Keynesian and Marxist scholars going to great lengths to refute this theory. Perhaps the most 
vigorous attack on this position was levelled by Marxist sociologist, Suzanne de Brunhoff 
(1982). After a critical analysis of the tenets of monetarism, de Brunhoff concludes her study 
with a sharp rebuttal of monetarist theory: 
To the extent that monetarism equals recession and creates unemployment it is simply an 
expression of capitalist practice as analysed by Marx. The reserve army of labour is the 
most certain instrument for restraining wages and disciplining labour and the most 
sparing of political repression. But monetarism today purports to go beyond the 
abandonment of the full employment target and yet in practice it fails to provide an 
operable set of policies that work against stagflation. That monetarist policy is reduced to 
anti-labour policy signals its retreat from economics to ideology. (1982: 293) 
The “reserve army of labour” that de Brunhoff is referring to is a classical Marxist theory. 
Marx argued that capitalism requires a reserve army of labour for several reasons: an 
unemployed labour force keeps wages and labour militancy down; the reserve army can also be 
absorbed into new segments of production when necessary; unemployed labour is also more 
flexible and mobile than employed segments of society (Marx, 1992: 781-90). For de Brunhoff, 
monetarism was a means of increasing the unemployment rate, or, put another way, a means of 
increasing the reserve army of labour. Increasing the reserve army of labour has the effect of 
reducing wage demands and labour militancy, which means that capitalists can accrue a greater 
share of profits. 
Less radical critiques of the monetarist position on unemployment also exist. Some 
economists question the validity of a “non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment” 





will gravitate in the long-run. Espinoza-Vega and Russell, for example, argue that the monetarist 
position “has fallen out of favour partly because its conceptual foundation is weak and partly 
because its empirical track record does not inspire confidence” (1997: 4-5). Similarly, post-
Keynesians and Marxists generally argue that, contrary to monetarist claims, the monetary 
supply can indeed have long-term effects on unemployment and growth rates (Saad-Filho, 2000). 
One of the central pillars of monetarism has therefore come under serious appraisal. The 
approach does not sufficiently engage with the long-term implications of its policy prescriptions.  
A second related critique of monetarism is that monetarists pay insufficient attention to 
the political context of their theory. As Donner and Peters note, “any major shift in economic 
policy can be made significantly easier if the political climate is favourable to the change” (1979: 
7). The political shift that took place in Canada and internationally during this period is almost 
entirely overlooked within the monetarist literature. These social and political concerns are 
effectively externalized on the basis of crisp and parsimonious economic models that dominate 
the neoclassical literature. 
Lewis (2003), for example, rightly argues that this dominant neoclassical or “objectivist” 
approach obscures the politics of Canadian fiscal and monetary policy. He argues that this 
objectivist position tends to assert that its analysis is motivated by “real” rather than 
“ideological” considerations. Adopting this objectivist position, however, does not say anything 
about how interested parties “may have generated public support for their fiscal [and monetary] 
agendas, or about the different pressures to which different parties are subject, but which those 
parties also try to manipulate” (2003: 9). In short, neoclassical scholars neutralize the politics of 
their economic analysis. 
Neglecting the political aspects of monetary policy is a fundamental oversight. The 





political consequences. Rather than integrating these political considerations into the analysis, 
most of the monetarist literature implicitly suggests that these social and political consequences 
are mere externalities of sound economic theory and policy. These are critical gaps in the 
literature that should be addressed. 
A second body of constructivist literature does take greater account of these political and 
social factors, but I argue that the constructivist approach introduced below does not sufficiently 
engage with the importance of class power. 
The	Political	Economy	of	Ideas	
“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are 
wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. 
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are 
usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, 
are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler a few years back. I am sure that the 
power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of 
ideas.”–John Maynard Keynes (1936: 5) 
 At the basis of the constructivist approach is an emphasis on ideas, rather than strictly 
economic factors. A specialist in ideational scholarship, Mark Blyth (2003) argues that this 
emphasis upon ideas emerged principally in the 1990s due to limitations in rational choice 
theory. Rational choice scholars emphasize stability, equilibrium and path-dependences. Rational 
choice theorists therefore struggled to explain how change occurred, and they turned to ideas as a 
means of resolving this struggle. Byth argues that “in turning toward ideas to explain stability, 





approach provided social scientists with a distinct framework with which to appraise the 
turbulent period of the 1970s and 80s. 
And indeed, a number of scholars have emphasized the central role of ideas in 
determining the nature and content of Canadian monetary policy (Bradford, Neil, 2000; Donner 
and Peters, 1979; Riddell, 1986). The central narrative of this approach is that the anti-
inflationary policies implemented beginning in 1975 can be explained by a shift in economic 
thinking away from broadly Keynesian ideas and toward more orthodox neoclassical thinking. In 
this section, I outline the general contours of this argument and provide a critique of its 
theoretical basis. While the constructivist approach does more effectively address the political 
substance of monetary policy than its monetarist counterpart, I argue that constructivist scholars 
have not adequately studied the structural tendencies of capital accumulation, or the class-based 
struggles that emerge around monetary policy.  
 The general constructivist argument, as stated above, is that a shift in economic thinking 
from broadly Keynesian to neoclassical theory occurred in the early 1970s. Baragar and 
Seccareccia (2008), for example, argue that contemporary economic conditions in Canada can be 
partially attributed to the shift from economic ideas which fostered Keynesian policies of 
industrial development and full employment to neoliberal ideas which favour finance capital. 
Lewis (2003) also provides a very systematic and compelling analysis of the role that ideas 
played in shaping Canadian fiscal and monetary policy throughout the 1970s and into the 1990s. 
He argues that Keynesian ideas of the post-war era were gradually displaced by their neoliberal 
variants. 
 A unique subset of the constructivist literature places greater emphasis upon changing 
economic theory and econometric modelling, rather than studying broader paradigm shifts. 





relates changing economic theories to the subsequent adoption of distinct monetary policies in 
Canada. Beginning with the role of economic theory, Riddell identifies three key theoretical 
developments that shaped monetary thinking from the 1950s through to the 1990s. In the first 
phase, economic thought during the post-war years broadly followed Keynesian principles, with 
full employment serving as the primary goal of macroeconomic policy. This is the context in 
which Reconstruction Minister C.D. Howe presented his White Paper on Employment and 
Income to Parliament in 1944 (cited in Babad, 1995: 58). Riddell argues that this Keynesian 
mode of thinking prevailed in Canada until the early 1960s, with low levels of unemployment 
achieved throughout the 1950s (1982: 8).  
This system came to be known as “embedded liberalism,” insofar as free markets were 
embedded in a social structure designed to more evenly distribute wealth across the population 
(Helleiner, 1990: 15). In essence, most developed states insured that sufficient capital was 
available to meet the growing needs of the emerging welfare state. Given the fiscal demands 
placed upon welfare states, governments could “no longer permit the practice of corporations and 
wealthy citizens moving their savings to countries with lower tax burdens in order to evade 
domestic taxation” (ibid). 
However, increasing levels of unemployment were coupled with rising rates of inflation 
in the late 1960s. This posed a clear problem for classical Keynesian theory, which allegedly 
held that inflation would only become problematic at levels of full employment. I stress the word 
“allegedly” because Keynes did not necessarily argue that inflation could only exist at levels of 
full employment. As economist Harold Chorney noted, “the kind of policies that passed for 
Keynesianism  were inaccurate representations of Keynes’ original doctrine” (Chorney, 2004: 
250). Nevertheless, the perception took hold that existing Keynesian models had failed. As Burns 





reality, a growing number of scholars argued that Keynesian policies and ideas were 
unsuccessful in simultaneously achieving price stability and full employment (AIB, 1979a: 5).  
 Thus, Riddell argues that the second phase marked a theoretical and methodological shift 
away from classical Keynesian models. In this second phase, the classical Keynesian model 
premised upon achieving full employment was replaced by the Phillips Curve trade-off in the 
early 1960s. The Phillips Curve represented a trade-off between inflation and unemployment. 
Economists provided evidence to argue that policymakers could choose a rate of unemployment 
that would be matched with an associated rate of inflation. The notion of full-employment was 
abandoned in favour of a more flexible balancing act between inflation and unemployment 
(Riddell, 1986: 9). Economic theory and ideas were therefore designed to shape material 
conditions on the ground. This trade-off did not represent a complete departure from Keynesian 
thinking, as economists argued that high levels of employment could be achieved with sufficient 
fine tuning. 
 However, this Phillips Curve model likewise came under attack by the late 1960s, as high 
rates of inflation were coupled with high levels of unemployment that were sharply out of synch 
with the Phillips Curve predictions. A third phase in macroeconomic thinking therefore emerged 
(Riddell, 1986: 10). Whereas adherents of the Phillips Curve argued that there was a trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment, a new group of scholars came to argue that there was a 
“non-accelerating natural rate of unemployment” (NIRU) to which the economy will invariably 
gravitate (for an overview see Kaldor, 1982: 22-23). This was the monetarist school, which came 
to displace Keynesian monetary policy in several developed countries by the mid-1970s.  
According to monetarist ideas, as detailed in the section above, expansionary monetary 
policy can only temporarily reduce the rate of unemployment, and interventionist monetary 





by Milton Friedman during his presidential address to the American Economic Association in 
1968, which is often regarded as a watershed moment in monetarist thinking. During the speech, 
Friedman provided a sharp critique of the prevailing Keynesian schools of thought and the 
existing Phillips Curve model.  Rather than attempting to mitigate unemployment through 
demand-driven policies, monetarists like Friedman argued that a more appropriate course would 
be to control inflation through supply-side measures (De Angelis, 2000: 147). Insuring a stable 
supply of state-backed money would serve as the best means of keeping inflation under control. 
This third phase of economic thinking came at an opportune moment for monetarists, as 
persistently high levels of inflation and unemployment undermined both classical Keynesian 
thinking and the more recent Phillips Curve models, providing the basis for a radically different 
set of ideas. Structural economic factors, therefore, did play an important role in shaping 
economic ideas of the time. The monetarist position, in particular, was premised upon 
undermining existing ideas. As Johnson argues, “the interest in monetarism […] is to be 
explained more by the fact that policy based on Keynesian theory, and concentrating on fiscal 
policy, has been an evident failure [rather than by a] full-scale scientific testing of the relative 
strength of the two approaches”—monetarism being the second approach (cited in Courchene, 
1981: 11). 
Whether or not this is true is a matter of considerable debate (Hein, 2008), but the 
important factor here is that existing theoretical models were undermined by economic 
conditions in the late 1960s, providing a window of opportunity for monetarist thinking to 
emerge. Nobay and Johnson also argue that monetarist doctrines emerged primarily as a critique 
of prevailing Keynesian ideas: 
Monetarism has in large measure preferred to concentrate its attack on Keynesianism by 





own framework […] Friedman’s 1968 Presidential Address is a powerful and cogent 
attack on Keynesianism and, in particular, is known for its challenge to the Keynesian use 
of the Phillips Curve for the ‘missing equation.’ (cited in Donner and Peters, 1979: 14) 
These three phases in monetary thinking—Keynesian, Phillips Curve and monetarist—
evolved over time, with each body of thought carrying its own set of policy prescriptions and 
economic principles. A review of the Canadian literature is certainly consistent with this 
understanding of monetary policy change. The studies by Bodkin et al. (1967) represent a fairly 
clear crystallization of the unemployment-inflation trade-off models of the 1960s, whereas 
virtually all of the material that emerged from the C.D. Howe Institute in the 1970s adopted a 
monetarist framework. In this respect, emphasising the role of economic models in shaping 
monetary policy remains a compelling approach.  
Finally, some of the constructivist literature very effectively addresses the manner in 
which ideas are transmitted from one locale to the next. Thus, Drainville (1995) identifies clear 
constructivist links between Canadian monetarists and various international actors. The fact that 
Canadian monetarist Thomas Courchene was educated at the University of Chicago offers fairly 
clear evidence of how ideas can physically travel. Similar to the works of Hall (1993) and 
Ikenberry (1992), it is possible to trace the diffusion of ideas from one nation-state to the next. It 
is also possible to trace how these ideas are adopted by policymakers. And indeed, research at 
the Bank of Canada in the 1960s increasingly began to take the monetarist framework seriously 
“in response to the burgeoning academic literature” (2009: 3). It is therefore possible to trace the 
knowledge-transfer of economic ideas across states and from academics into the policy process 
and popular discourse. 
This constructivist approach to monetary policy does have its benefits. Contrary to its 





political dynamics of monetary policy. Lewis’ work on Canadian fiscal and monetary policy, for 
example, aims to examine the “political and economic conditions that support the selection of 
some ideas over others… (2003: 4). Monetary and fiscal ideas are therefore not regarded as 
neutral devices, but are instead situated in a political and economic context which influences the 
prevalence of certain ideas over others. Donner and Peters likewise argue that “ideology or value 
judgments usually play a complementary role to economic theory…” (1979: 12). The 
incorporation of political circumstances and dynamics into the study of economic policy is an 
improvement upon the neoclassical literature. While neoclassical scholarship does retain a strong 
empirical base, it does not follow that neoclassical theories and research findings are politically 
neutral. Their implementation has distinct social, political and economic impacts that cannot be 
neglected. 
Also unlike the monetarist approach, which adopts a single theoretical framework and 
applies it consistently to the conduct of monetary policy, the constructivist approach offers a 
more fluid means of understanding the evolution of monetary ideas over time. Monetary 
frameworks are not regarded as fixed and immutable, but as contested theoretical positions with 
various contenders in the wings. Nevertheless, while the constructivist approach does have its 
merits, there are also fairly clear weaknesses within the literature. 
Critiques	of	the	Constructivist	Approach	
Despite his stated emphasis upon the role of political and economic conditions, Lewis 
accords primary emphasis to the role of ideas throughout his book. He does not pay sufficient 
attention to the political struggles and vested interests that shape these ideas. This is a 
shortcoming within the constructivist literature more generally. Scholars adopting the 





may serve. This runs the risk of overlooking political struggles that take place between 
competing interests by according greater emphasis to the struggle over ideas. 
Regarding the importance of material interests in shaping policy outcomes, Lewis’ work 
is illustrative of constructivist scholarship more generally. Lewis cites a report published by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as having marked a critical 
shift from broadly Keynesian to monetarist thinking. Once this shift in thinking had occurred, 
political interests then fostered the new monetarist paradigm. Lewis writes that “developments in 
economic theory brought Keynesian notions of sound macroeconomic policy under increasing 
challenge across industrialized nations, including Canada. The acceptance of these theoretical 
changes in bureaucracies often required political sponsorship to be fully expressed” (2003: 95). 
In other words, the emergence of new economic theory undermined the existing Keynesian 
project. Political interests then came to adopt this change in economic theory. This linear 
argument flows from a change in economic thinking to a subsequent change in political practice. 
However, this linear trajectory could be entirely reversed. One could begin with political 
and material interests, and then study how these interests manifest themselves in economic ideas 
and public policy. After all, as Lewis himself notes, “policies embodying ideas about liberalizing 
the economy were selected for their utility in realizing interests…” (2003: 103). If this is the 
case, it would make sense to determine the nature of various competing interests, and to then 
study how these interests come to express themselves through ideas. Most constructivist 
scholarship approaches economic policy from the other direction entirely. Ideas are treated as the 
primary unit of analysis, with various interests then adopting these ideas to achieve their 
particular ends. 
Peter Hall, arguably one of the most sophisticated exponents of the constructivist 





Kingdom (1993). As Blyth notes, Hall addresses these concerns by paying attention to “how a 
policy paradigm privileges certain actions over others and how authority over policy is as much a 
function of the flow of ideas as brute resources” (Blyth, 1997: 237). However, as Blyth argues, 
Hall examines the formation and implementation of ideas largely as an elite process. “The elite 
game may tell us how the ideas get from the blackboard to the party, but not how or why certain 
ideas come to be accepted over others” (ibid). This is an important oversight, because it again 
points toward the importance of underlying interests within a given idea. It is entirely possible 
that one idea is accepted over another because particular actors have vested political or material 
interests in insuring that a given idea prevails. An idea is often merely a means of obtaining or 
retaining particular interests. It follows that attention should be paid to the underlying interests, 
rather than strictly focusing on the ideas which facilitate these interests.  
In short, while the constructivist approach does provide much greater political depth than 
its monetarist counterpart, much of this literature does not sufficiently address the inherent power 
dynamics and underlying interests of a given idea. Scholars adopting constructivist frameworks 
do not sufficiently address the question of who benefits from a given idea, nor do they 
sufficiently address why one idea gains policy traction over another. Bieler and Morton acutely 
summarize this critique by posing a series of questions that are left unaddressed by constructivist 
scholars: 
Whose values and beliefs have constituted or embodied state identities and interests and 
the relevant constitutional structure of the international society of states? Which agents 
shape the core intersubjective beliefs of underlying social and world orders? Why does a 
particular set of ideas become part of the structure and not another? As it stands, there 





fail to ascertain whose interpretations come to constitute the social world and why they 
do so. (2008: 109) 
Much like its monetarist counterpart, therefore, this constructivist approach would benefit 
from greater attention to the power dynamics and material interests inherent in monetary policy. 
In the following theoretical section, I present a Marxian framework which places class interests 
and class power at the center of analysis, arguing that a Marxian framework is sufficiently rich to 
capture the inherent political and material interests in any given monetary policy. A Marxian 
analysis along these lines can effectively overcome the shortcomings of both the monetarist and 





















Scholars who adopt an ideational approach do not outright neglect material and 
distributional considerations (Bailey and Schonhardt-Bailey, 2008; Blyth, 2003; Chwieroth, 
2007). These authors simply argue that, under certain circumstances, ideas are equally or more 
important than the role of interests. Chwieroth, for example, argues that material interests must 
be mediated and interpreted by policymakers (2007: 410). Therefore, while recognizing the 
importance of interests, Chwieroth argues that mediation and interpretation are nevertheless 
critical components of analysis. One can indeed hold that ideas and material interests are both 
essential concepts that must be appraised with equal consideration. In this sense, interests cannot 
simply be brought back into the analysis, because they never really left. That said, constructivist 
scholarship generally does not place sufficient emphasis upon material interests and 
distributional struggles. These material factors are subordinated as a means of placing greater 
emphasis upon the role of economic ideas. Material struggles should be more critically appraised 
in this regard. 
In order to make this argument, however, a theoretical apparatus must be established 
from which to examine monetary phenomena. At their basis, Marxist explanations examine 
political events and economic processes as being innately tied to distributions of class power. A 
fundamental distinction can be drawn here between neoclassical and Marxist theory. 
Neoclassical economics may vary with respect to its research findings, but neoclassical literature 
is consistent in its application of rational choice theory, which holds that human agents are 
utility-maximizing individuals. As political economist Ben Fine has argued, neoclassical 
economics are pervaded by “individualistic, utilitarian overtones” (2004: 10). Monetarism, for 





maximizing individuals. Monetarists generally hold that “markets reliably and stably enforce a 
growth path on the real economy determined by tastes, technology and resources” leaving 
monetary policy “powerless to affect the real economy” (Foley, 2010). Marxist theory can 
readily be distinguished from neoclassical theory in this regard.  
Rather than studying agents as utility-maximizing individuals, Marxists study individual 
agents as members of distinct economic classes. As Foley notes, neoclassical economic theorists 
are “reluctant to entertain or even grasp theories that concern emergent social phenomena, 
especially class” (1989: 2). Adopting a Marxist framework may yield unique research findings, 
in this respect, given that their unit of analysis shifts from individuals to economic classes. Class-
based dynamics of distributional conflict and power struggle are brought to the centre of 
analysis—considerations of which are entirely overlooked within the neoclassical literature. 
Drawing upon the Parisian regulation school of political economy (Harvey, 1990; 
Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 1997; Smardon, 2010; Soederberg, 2001), I argue that there are two 
principal Marxist approaches to the study of monetary policy: systemic and agency-based 
approaches. The systemic approach utilizes aggregate data to capture macro-level processes and 
distributional struggles. The agency-based approach, conversely, identifies specific actors and 
their role within a given class struggle. As I argue below, each approach has its merits, but a 
synthesis of systemic and agency-based approaches is the most effective means of studying 
monetary policy from a Marxist perspective. A synthesis along these lines captures the macro-
level processes inherent in the capital accumulation cycle, while integrating agency-based 
analyses helps capture the micro-level factors and struggles that feed this cycle. 
The first section of this chapter outlines the manner in which monetary policy is 





section, followed by systemic-based theory in the third section. Drawing upon the regulation 
school literature, a synthesis of these two approaches is developed in the fourth section. 
Systemic	Frameworks	
Rather than studying economic ideas as independent units of analysis—as constructivist 
scholarship generally does—systemic Marxist approaches situate economic ideas in relation to 
material conditions of production. Prevailing economic ideas will rely partially upon the means 
of production during any given time. Within capitalist means of production, distinct social 
relations emerge with equally distinct ideas. Bieler and Morton introduce this distinction through 
emphasising modes of exploitation: 
In contrast to pre-capitalist forms, characterised by the extra-economic direct political 
enforcement of exploitation and surplus extraction, surplus appropriation and exploitation 
within capitalism is indirectly conducted through contractual relations between those who 
maintain the power of appropriation, as owners of the means of production, over those 
who only have their labour to sell, as expropriated producers. (2003: 471) 
Two distinct social forces therefore emerge within capitalist modes of production: 
workers and capitalists. Adopting a systemic approach, capital and labour are lumped into 
aggregate classes that compete against one another over the material distribution of wealth and 
power. Economistic variants of this systemic approach operationalize these conflicting classes, 
quantify their power and attempt to determine which class is more powerful at any given time, 
with economic and political outcomes favouring the more powerful class. This competition is 
waged within a capitalist system that goes through a continuous cycle of boom and bust (see 
Graphic 1). The nature and outcome of these cycles is determined largely, or at least partially, by 





The same logic applies to the prevailing political and economic ideas of any given time. 
Distinct class configurations emerge and these actors collectively come to express conflicting 
economic ideas to suit their particular class interests. This does not imply that ideas are 
structurally determined; however, it does suggest that ideas are structurally delineated. That is to 
say, the prevailing means of production will partially determine the social relations that prevail 
during any given time. The means of production under slavery placed slave-owners in relation to 
slaves; feudal means of production situated lords in relation to serfs; within capitalist modes of 
production, the prevailing social relation is between workers and capitalists. According to 
systemic approaches, then, economic and political ideas within these systems will oscillate 
between these social forces.  
Applying this systemic logic to monetary policy, which is itself an economic lever within 
the capitalist mode of production, prevailing ideas and policies of any given time depend upon 
the particular configuration of class forces. A militant and cohesive working class can exert 
upward pressure on inflation by making wage demands, whereas an assertive capitalist class can 
reduce inflationary pressures by weakening the strength of labour. Both social forces can 
likewise channel their energies toward the state itself as a means of shaping monetary policy to 
suit their particular class interests. As I will argue below, a systemic analysis of this nature has 
the benefit of situating monetary phenomena within a far broader context of capital 
accumulation, cyclical crises and class struggle. However, these systemic approaches largely 
neglect the critical importance of agency in their class-based analysis. In a sense, they repeat the 
errors of their monetarist counterparts by sterilizing class struggle in favour of analysis of 
aggregate trends. 






Rowthorn (1980) was a leading early proponent of the systemic approach, arguing that 
wages are determined by class struggle between capital and labour. As Marx suggests, this 
struggle “resolves itself into a question of the respective power of the combatants” (cited in 
Rowthorn, 1980: 133). There are nevertheless clear limitations to working class wage gains 
within a capitalist system: 
No matter how strongly organized the trade-union movement, however, there are inherent 
limits to the effectiveness of purely economic struggle. Capitalists control production and 
they will not invest unless they receive a certain ‘normal’ rate of profit. If wages rise too 
rapidly, either because of extreme labour shortage or because of militant trade unions, the 
rate of profit falls below its ‘normal’ level, capitalists refuse to invest, expansion grinds 
to a standstill and there is a crisis. (1980: 133) 
There is an interesting additional component of this analysis that requires some 












backed money in order to foster economic growth. This again accords a critical role to the state. 
A strong working or capitalist class can place pressure upon the state at any stage of the 
accumulation cycle. When faced with class-pressure during the downturn of an economic cycle, 
the state may opt to inject money into the markets as a means of offsetting a crisis. Rowthorn 
explains the matter succinctly: “Now, for obvious reasons, a crisis is not exactly an attractive 
proposition to either workers or capitalists, and the state may be tempted to choose the other 
alternative, and accept rising prices as the inevitable cost of economic growth” (1980: 138).  
Under these conditions, labour and capital can place sufficient pressure upon the state to insure 
that its interests are met. 
Like Rowthorn, Epstein (2002) has also developed a systemic approach to the study of 
class conflict and monetary policy. Epstein’s work falls more closely within a post-Keynesian 
than a Marxist framework, but he nevertheless argues that central banks are “‘contested terrains’ 
of class and intra-class conflict over the distribution of income and power in the macroeconomy” 
(2002: 17). Whereas Rowthorn regarded class conflict as taking place between capital and 
labour, Epstein draws upon Keynes to include a class of “rentier” or financial interests. These 
rentiers have become increasingly influential in promoting monetary policies that keep inflation 
rates low and reduce the influence of “democratic forces” upon the conduct of monetary policy 
(2002: 5). 
Two critical factors of analysis for Epstein are the degree to which a central bank is 
fighting inflation, and the relative autonomy of the central bank from the elected government. 
For Epstein, this autonomy or “central bank independence” (CBI) is a critical indicator that 
monetary policy is being guided by rentier interests. He argues that “this elevation of inflation 





income going to rentiers; it is also fundamentally an issue of reducing the political power of 
labour and other groups in the making of macroeconomic policy”  (ibid: 16). 
The systemic nature of Epstein’s framework is clear. He identifies four critical variables 
in the study of monetary policy: (1) the structure of capital-labor relations; (2) the political 
structure of the central bank (an independent bank or integrated into the government); (3) 
connections between finance and industry; and (4) the position of the nation in the world 
economy (anywhere from a small closed economy to a large open economy). Epstein then 
develops a formula with which to measure these variables in order to determine the relative 
power of industrial, financial and labouring classes. 
This systemic approach provides two important contributions to the study of monetary 
policy not accounted for in both the neoclassical and constructivist literature. Firstly, the global 
economy is recognized as being in a state of constant disequilibrium. This stands in sharp 
contrast with neoclassical economics, which is premised upon models of economic equilibrium 
in which supply balances with demand. Treating the global economy as operating in a state of 
constant disequilibrium has important implications for the ideational literature as well.  
This leads to the second contribution of the systemic approach which fundamentally 
distinguishes Marxist from constructivist theory. Ideas are no longer treated as independent units 
of analysis. Instead, ideas are situated within a particular historical and social context, with 
particular emphasis upon the prevailing means of production. The means of production 
effectively shapes—and is shaped by—distinct social relations that partially delimit the ideas of 
any given time. This systemic approach therefore offers one means of explaining why certain 
ideas prevail over others. During a downturn in the accumulation cycle, prevailing ideas are 
likely to be challenged or dislodged, which is precisely what happened with Keynesian ideas 





systemic dynamics of capital accumulation, yet ideational scholars do not situate economic ideas 
of a given period within these systemic dynamics. 
The systemic approaches adopted by Rowthorn and Epstein nevertheless leave some 
critical questions unanswered. In both Rowthorn and Epstein’s frameworks, class struggle is 
operationalized using economic formula, with little to no emphasis placed upon the role of 
agency. That is to say, class remains a fairly abstract concept within these conflict-theories of 
inflation.  How does class struggle manifest itself through monetary policy? How and why would 
the capitalist and working classes attempt to exert their class power through monetary policy, 
rather than through other means of class struggle? Rowthorn and Epstein fall short on these 
questions. Rowthorn’s central argument is that capital refuses to reinvest in the production 
process, effectively creating a crisis of capital in order to reduce the relative power of labour. 
This accords very little influence to the central bank, monetary policy and agency. Indeed, while 
this systemic approach explains why class struggle occurs, it does not sufficiently explain how 
class struggle is waged and to what ends.  
This is an important oversight, particularly with respect to authors like Rowthorn, who 
identify themselves as Marxist. Marxist theory is called historical materialism because it 
explicitly seeks to ground itself in the historical and material conditions that prevail during any 
given period of analysis or political action. This systemic approach effectively unbeds itself from 
both this historical and material context. Systemic approaches to monetary policy can therefore 
only be regarded as a partial account of monetary policy during a given time. 
Agency‐based	Frameworks	
Class struggle is not an abstract phenomenon. Struggle of any kind requires opposing 





their influence in order to achieve class-based objectives. One of the central aims of the Parisian 
regulation school was to bring active subjects back into economic analysis. As Jessop argues, 
“without taking account of the subjects who acted as bearers of structures, it was virtually 
impossible to theorise how contradictions could ever be even temporarily stabilised” (1997: 
505). Agency-based approaches to monetary policy therefore examine the role that competing 
economic classes play as they try to influence policy outcomes. Some agency-based studies 
attempt to determine the nature of how classes network and interact (Carroll, 2010), while others 
seek to explore the power and influence of these competing classes (Drainville, 1995). Unlike the 
systemic approach, agency-based analysis is more explicitly grounds class struggle within 
particular historical and social contexts. Thus, while systemic approaches can identify macro-
level processes and trends that shape and constrain monetary-policy ideas and decisions, the 
agency-based approach adds political and historical substance to these otherwise abstract 
processes. 
Those who adopt an agency-based approach recognize that ideas are not simply 
determined by the prevailing mode of production. Instead, ideas are treated as politically 
contested and unstable. Gramsci outlines this approach in his description of ideology. He notes 
that “ideologies are anything but arbitrary; they are real historical facts which must be combated 
and their nature as instruments of domination exposed…precisely for reasons of political 
struggle” (cited in Bieler and Morton, 2008: 119). In this sense, economic ideas are regarded as 
instruments of control and domination. Ideas are not fixed and immutable, but are instead sites of 
conflict and political struggle.  
With respect to monetary policy, Drainville (1995) is one of the few scholars that adopts 
an agency-based approach to study Canadian monetary policy in the 1970s. He identifies key 





policy development, reformulation and implementation. Class is no longer treated in the 
aggregate; instead, classes are disaggregated into a network of distinct elite actors with particular 
interests and aims. The mere identification of monetary policy actors, however, would not 
provide any explanatory power whatsoever. Drainville’s work is compelling precisely because 
actors are identified in order to explain the processes by which these actors go about creating and 
implementing new monetary policies.  
Drainville develops a persuasive argument that a particular ensemble of individuals and 
institutions developed a global monetarist “reading” of the economy. This reading was then 
transmitted on a global scale, remaining sensitive to particular national contexts and 
circumstances. The global transmission of monetary ideas is examined by tracing the movements 
and interactions between key monetary policy decision-makers and other elites, including 
researchers and journalists. Yet Drainville never loses sight of the material and distributive 
components of analysis. He argues that “monetarist discourses were, of course, shaped by the 
varying powers of the central banks, and by different national opportunities for strict monetary 
control, within an environment in which other political actors pressed their claims and priorities” 
(Drainville, 1995: 15). Monetary policy is therefore regarded as a contested terrain upon which 
competing interests with varying levels of power struggle to achieve desired ends. 
Dickens (1996; 1997)  has likewise devoted substantial efforts to the study of monetary 
policy from an agency-based perspective. He argues that monetary policy in the United States 
throughout the 1950s and into the 1970s was premised largely upon “the capital-labour conflict 
over the terms of the employment relation” (1995: 103). Monetary policy in the 1950s was 
designed explicitly along class lines, and these policies “succeeded in weakening labour 





This agency-based framework serves as a critical addition to the systemic approach 
adopted by Rowthorn and Epstein. Agency-based frameworks identify the micro-level factors of 
class struggle that remain overlooked within most macro-level studies. Rather than regarding 
ideas as being structurally determined by the prevailing mode of production, ideas are instead 
treated as a locus of political struggle between competing interests. This emphasis on struggle 
and conflict accords agency-based approaches with a distinct advantage over their structuralist 
counterparts; namely, emphasising struggle rather than structure allows scholars to account for 
how economic ideas and policies change over time. This stands in marked contrast with systemic 
approaches, which are far more adept in explaining stasis and stability of given economic ideas, 
structures and policies. 
 While agency-based frameworks do have their merits, it does not follow that systemic 
approaches should be abandoned altogether. Structural factors do generally yield substantial 
influence over the prevailing ideas of any given period, with the capitalist mode of production 
insuring that social relations can be divided into two distinct classes: capital and labour. Capital, 
by its very nature, will seek to improve the profits by increasing the rate of exploitation of 
labour. This necessarily pits capital against labour, with these two competing interests struggling 
over economic ideas and policies. A more synthetic approach which recognizes the importance 
of both structure and agency is therefore necessary. Synthetic structure-agency frameworks along 
these lines have been developed within Marxist theory. Existing approach can therefore serve as 
useful templates for the study of monetary policy and the contested terrain of central banking. 
Toward	a	Synthesis	
Why did anti-inflationary policy prescriptions prevail in Canada through the 1970s and 





respect to the conduct of monetary policy. One can begin with reference to Theodor Adorno, 
who notes that supposedly objective items such as money must be problematized. The money-
form within capitalist modes of production embodies a governing system of exchange and social 
relations (cited in Bieler and Morton, 2008: 115). Critically, the capitalist form of exchange 
requires that profit be generated. Exchange within capitalist modes of production is, therefore, 
necessarily unequal: a level of exploitation is necessary in order for the extraction of profit. 
The proliferation of money exchange requires some means of coordination. Central banks 
therefore emerge as a critical locus in circulation of money. Indeed, the abandonment of gold 
reserves in the 1970s has effectively increased state power, insofar as political and legal backing 
of money becomes a necessity if people are to have any confidence in the stability and worth of 
their money (Harvey, 2007: 244). As Bruce Hall notes: 
In our contemporary era of fiat money in which we lack a capacity to measure the value 
of money against an external standard – such as gold or some other valuable commodity 
in limited supply—all money is fiat money. Money’s value is stipulated by fiat, and the 
central bank explicitly or implicitly pledges to maintain that fiat value. Thus money is a 
promise. (2008: 2) 
There is one fundamental caveat to this statement, however. Money is not strictly a 
promise; there remains a material base within the economy, and this material base is measured 
not by money, but by the amount of human labour expended upon the production of commodities 
(for overviews of this debate see Fine and Filho, 2004; Foley, 2006; Harvey, 2007; Harvey, 
2010; Saad-Filho, 2000). One can therefore distinguish between money as a measure of price, 
and value as a measure of human labour. It is entirely possible that the amount of money 
circulating exceeds the amount of value produced by human labour. However, should agents lose 





forms of capital and return to a truer measure of value. Harvey notes that this contradiction 
between money and value… 
can be traced back directly to the dual functions of money as a measure of value and as a 
medium of circulation. When money functions as a measure of value it must truly 
represent the values it helps to circulate [i.e. value as measured by human labour.] When 
money functions as a medium of circulation, on the other hand, it must divorce itself from 
the ‘true’ representation of value, permit market prices to deviate from values and prove 
itself the flexible lubricant of an exchange process that is unpredictable and perpetually 
changing (293).  
This unpredictability and fluctuation leads constructivists to emphasise that money is 
essentially issued by fiat and is based on a “promise” between those engaged in exchange. 
However, constructivist scholars frequently downplay or neglect the Marxist conception of value 
as a measure of socially necessary human labour. Blyth, for example, dismisses the Marxist 
argument that value is measured by the inputs of human labour into a given commodity. He asks: 
did housing prices in the United Kingdom undergo a 160 percent increase between 1997 and 
2005 because more labour was put into them? And if one musician spends more time in the 
studio producing an album than another musician, is the former’s album more valuable? The 
obvious answer to both of these questions is “no.” Blyth therefore notes that “without a 
subjective notion of value as subjective utility with price as a denominator it is literally 
impossible to understand much of anything in a modern economy” (2009: 11). This is indeed 
true, but a distinction must nevertheless be drawn between this subjective measure of “value,” 
and the value created by human labour. This distinction becomes particularly important 





When the central bank ties its money tightly to a gold standard, it has very little room for 
manoeuvre. A limited gold reserve forces it to raise interest rates to a point of extreme 
usury at a time when all capitalists seek refuge in high-quality money. When 
convertibility into gold is permanently (as opposed to temporarily) suspended, the 
quantity of central bank money and the rate of interest on that money can become policy 
instruments. The ‘art’ of central banking is to use these policy instruments to try to 
stabilize the inherently unstable course of accumulation. At the same time the severance 
of central bank money from gold gives rise to the formal possibility of sustained inflation. 
(2007: 307) 
In essence, the distinction between this subjective and material measure of value requires 
that the state—the central bank, more specifically—instils confidence among those using the 
national currency (Bruce Hall, 2008). This places the state and central bank as fundamentally 
linked to the process of capital accumulation. The central bank is therefore a “central point 
within the state apparatus” or what Marx calls “the pivot of the credit system” (cited in Harvey, 
2007: 281). For Marxists and some Keynesians, then, it is hardly surprising that this institution 
would be a “contested terrain” over the distribution of wealth, class power and control over the 
macroeconomy (Epstein, 2002).  
We are therefore left with a system of monetary exchange that is inherently unstable and 
crisis-prone. This, in turn, spurred the creation of central banks, which were created to smooth 
the inherent growth dynamics and crisis tendencies of capital. It follows that economic ideas and 
policy prescriptions regarding monetary policy will be limited to those which foster sustained 
capital accumulation. Within capitalist states, therefore, prevailing ideas and policy prescriptions 
will be structurally limited to those which favour capital accumulation. Systemic conditions 





Nevertheless, significant diversity of monetary ideas remains plausible within the 
confines of the capitalist mode of production. Monetary ideas and policies can be promoted 
which foster full levels employment, just as ideas of aggressive monetary restraint can be 
fostered, which invariably increase levels of unemployment. Therefore, while systemic 
conditions of capital accumulation partially limit the spectrum of economic ideas and policy 
proposals, there remains significant breadth for conflict and struggle over which ideas and 
policies prevail. 
Looked at in this way, monetary ideas are highly contested yet remain embedded within 
the prevailing mode of production. Moreover, ideas can only take shape in practice if a particular 
group of actors decides to foster and implement these ideas. That is to say, as Stuart Hall notes, 
“ideas only become effective if they do, in the end, connect with a particular constellation of 
social forces. In that sense, ideological struggle is a part of the general social struggle for mastery 
and leadership—in short for hegemony” (cited in Bieler and Morton, 2008: 119). 
Adopting a theoretical approach that is inclusive of both structure and agency requires the 
following: an understanding of the prevailing mode of production during a given period. This is 
necessary given that specific class configurations will vary depending on the particular form of 
capital accumulation (ibid: 120). For example, highly industrialised organizational forms will 
result in corporatist struggles over monetary policy with capital, labour and the state mediating 
amongst themselves over monetary policy outcomes. Organizational forms of production will 
therefore influence—but not determine—which monetary ideas and policies prevail within a 
given space and time. Prevailing monetary ideas and policies are instead determined by political 






In this regard, synthesizing system with agency also requires the identification of social 
forces and powers within a given period of time. These social forces are not static and should 
instead be regarded as continually evolving in terms of their influence and political power. 
Drawing from Mahon (1977), it is possible to examine monetary policy as one particular nodal 
point of class struggle within the state system. More specifically, monetary policy can be 
regarded as the expression and reinforcement of particular class interests and alliances. Within 
the state itself, central banks assume an immense position of power. Mahon argues that each 
branch of the state can be identified in relation to three key features: “its internal superiority vis-
à-vis other departments; its connection with other important points in the state system (for 
example, the provincial governments and the co-ordinating institutions of the international 
system); and its relationship to social forces” (1977: 175). On these key features, Mahon argues 
that the Department of Finance is the most powerful state institution, given its coordinating 
function and influence across state branches, regions and scales of governance. However, I argue 
that the Bank of Canada maintains a position of power which significantly influences the 
Department of Finance itself. Through control of the money supply, interest and inflation, the 
Bank of Canada effectively serves as an economic throttle within the Canadian state and 
globally.  Moreover, in Canada, the central bank is largely autonomous from influence by the 
elected government (see Chapter 4). This means that civil servants and executives within the 
Bank of Canada can make decisions without interference from conventional democratic 
channels.  
 Finally, a synthetic approach to the structure-agency problem entails the identification of 
various monetary ideas that emerge. Rather than treating ideas as independent units of analysis, 
as constructivist scholars are generally inclined to do, a synthetic Marxist approach examines 





Social class forces are identified as core collective actors through a focus on the social 
relations of production. By acknowledging the location of these actors within the social 
relations of production, that is, the underlying power structure, it is then possible to 
address the question of why a certain set of ideas, rooted within these material relations, 
dominates at a particular point in time. (ibid: 123) 
A synthetic approach can address the central weakness of constructivist theory; namely, 
the failure of constructivist scholarship to sufficiently account for why certain ideas prevail over 
others during a given point in time. Focusing on the organizational structure of production and 
the various class fractions involved in this organizational structure helps explain why some 
social forces are more powerful than others at a given time. This does not, however, imply that 
more powerful social forces will necessarily prevail in achieving their desired objectives. Ideas 
are structurally constrained—but not determined—by the prevailing mode of production and its 
particular organizational form. Having outlined this theoretical synthesis, it is now possible to 




















“We’ll put a few union leaders in jail for three years and others will get the message”—Prime 
Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau jokes to the press, Oct. 26, 1976. 
  
 A foreign observer of the post-war Canadian economy would see a very different country 
from what exists today. The post-war economy was typified by a highly industrialized heartland 
in central Canada, with the manufacturing sector and auto-industry serving as the core productive 
base. Finance and capital flows were tightly regulated under the Bretton Woods system, and the 
aim of monetary and fiscal policy was to achieve full employment (Smardon, 2010). Canadians 
and new immigrants returning from World War II were promised stable employment and 
income. This period has variously come to be defined as a Fordist regime of accumulation, 
Keynesianism or the embedded liberal order, which I define in greater detail below (Harvey, 
1990; Harvey, 2005). 
The picture looks radically different today. The industrial horseshoe around central 
Canada has been significantly hollowed out under pressures of outsourcing and globalization. 
The productive engine of the Canadian economy has been replaced by volatile resource 
extraction and export, with the Alberta tar sands serving as the lung of economic growth. The 
Bretton Woods regulatory system has been abandoned in favour of free capital flows, and the 
Bank of Canada has radically shifted its policy-focus away from full employment toward 
inflation control. 
My central contention is that this major reconfiguration of national and global production 
was a significant contributing factor to the Bank of Canada’s turn toward inflation control. 
Organized labour was a powerful social force during the Fordist regime of accumulation, but the 





of accumulation unravelled. Resurgent business and financial classes rose to place increasing 
influence over the conduct of monetary policy. I argue that the shift from employment-driven 
monetary policy to inflation-control is largely the result of shifting configurations of class power.   
This argument stands in sharp contrast with constructivist scholarship. While changes in 
prevailing ideas and ideology were critically important to this reorientation in monetary policy, 
new ideas could only gain policy traction when backed by powerful social forces. Looked at this 
way, the reconfiguration of social forces and organizational forms influenced which monetary 
policies and ideas prevailed over others. This chapter is divided into three parts to address each 




“Whatever else may need to be done to bring inflation under control, it is absolutely essential to 
keep the rate of monetary expansion within reasonable limits”–Bank of Canada Governor, 
Gerald Bouey, 1975. 
 
With this statement, Bank of Canada governor Gerald Bouey ushered in an era of 
Canadian monetarism, but the road to monetarism was never smooth. Social upheaval and class 
struggle in the late 1960s and early 1970s was significant. The struggles waged around 
monetarism are examined in this section. As stated in the theoretical section above, the 
prevailing organizational form of national and global capital must first be identified. With 
respect to the late 1960s and early 1970s, the prevailing organizational form has come to be 
known as Fordism. This organizational form entails industrial production that accords substantial 
power to organized labour. The state also plays a critical role, fostering industrial-scale 
production “either directly through actions such as state-mediated labour relations or indirectly 
through the impact of the national policy in supporting the intensive period of growth…” 





fosters social reproduction through the nationalization of key sectors including healthcare and 
education. This welfare state reaching its “greatest extent” roughly from 1945 to 1975 (Sears, 
1999: 92). Duménil summarizes the basic contours of this organizational form, which he defines 
as the prevailing “social order” of the post-war era: 
It rests on a social compromise between the managerial classes and the popular classes of 
production and clerical-commercial workers. The prerogatives of capitalist classes—their 
powers and income—are considerably diminished. In a number of countries, entire 
sections of the productive economy, nonfinancial and financial, are nationalized; overall, 
the autonomy of managers in the conduct of corporations is considerably increased; 
policies aim at employment, growth, and the rise of productivity, in conformity with the 
‘productivist’ trends that dominate the period; the activity of the financial sector is 
directed toward growth. The compromise with popular classes is expressed in the 
progress of purchasing powers, social protection, and the progress of education. There is 
an overall strong faith in ‘progress,’ both social and technical (while ecological equilibria 
are destroyed). These transformations are typical of the countries of the Centre—in the 
context of an unchecked continuation of imperialist trends, despite ambitious 
development policies as in Latin America and Asia. (2010) 
This particular Fordist organizational form set the stage for subsequent conflicts that 
emerged over the choice of Canadian monetary policy. This organizational form can also be 
situated within a capital accumulation cycle that fluctuates through booms and busts. The 
immediate post-war era was certainly a time of rapid economic growth, but cracks in this pattern 
began to emerge in the late 1960s. The late 1960s and early 1970s, many critical scholars argue, 





Duménil (2010) argues that the early 1970s marked a structural crisis of capital, distinguishing 
structural crises from smaller recessions based upon their size, duration and global character.  
Global capital in the 1970s was on the precipice of significant downturn in the 
accumulation cycle, and branches of the Canadian state were clearly aware that the global 
economy was entering a period of serious volatility, as a comprehensive report issued by the 
Canadian Anti-Inflation Board in 1979 indicates: 
…unusual developments in the external environment were making it extremely difficult 
for domestic policies. All principal industrial countries were experiencing high rates of 
real growth. It appears in retrospect that they may have been operating under excess 
demand conditions. These conditions contributed to large and rapid increases in the price 
of commodities, compounded by shortages of agricultural products. (1979a: 19) 
Under these conditions of rapid capital accumulation and rising inflation, a structural 
crisis of capital emerged. Industrial and developing countries suddenly faced the dual problem of 
high inflation and economic decline—that is to say, stagflation. This structural crisis opened a 
window of opportunity for conflicting class forces to reconfigure the prevailing organizational 
form of national and global capital, along with their relative economic and political power. This 
required a change in all of the key elements of Fordism identified by Duménil, including the 
compromise between managerial and popular classes. Looked at in this way, monetary policy 
was simply one channel among many through which competing class interests could struggle. 
The state still operated along broadly Keynesian lines prior to 1975, with the Philips 
Curve model serving as the general guide for Canadian monetary policy. The Philips Curve was 
an aberration from Keynesianism, but nevertheless allowed for a trade-off between inflation rates 
and unemployment. However, mounting stagflationary problems placed this policy at risk, as 





for monetary policy precisely because the employment side of this trade-off was done away with. 
The central bank and broad segments of the state apparatus began to focus single-mindedly on 
the inflationary side of the stagflation problem. 
As I argue below, the struggle over monetary policy—specifically during the monetarist 
period—was largely conducted within executive and administrative levels of government. The 
elected Liberal government at the time was a focal point of struggle, as members of the cabinet 
resisted monetarist doctrines being proposed by their own party. The argument could be made 
that this does not represent class struggle whatsoever, given that these were elite officials 
struggling amongst themselves. Yet, as I argue below, the context of this executive-level struggle 
was explicitly class-based. Those opposing monetarist doctrines recognized the class dimensions 
of monetarism and sought to resist these policies. The most critical struggle, in this respect, was 
that between Liberal finance minister John Turner and his own political party. 
As anti-inflationary rhetoric mounted throughout the early 1970s, Turner sought to obtain 
consensus from business and labour interests over wage and price controls. In essence, the 
struggle to reduce inflation was a struggle over the distribution of rapidly diminishing profits. 
Turner sought to reach a compromise between competing interests by having businesses reduce 
their prices and unions moderate their wage-settlement demands. Turner noted in his 1974 
budget speech that: 
No group is likely to succeed in getting the full share of the real national pie to which it 
feels entitled. So long as each continues to attempt to enforce its claim by pushing up its 
price, its wage, its interest rate or tax rate, the outcome can only be further inflation. We 
have to find a better way of reconciling the competing interests of the various groups 





Attempts to achieve consensus between competing class interests were in vain, as 
organized labour did not want to make wage concessions and corporate interests were reluctant 
to reduce prices in the face of strong wage demands and rising inflation. Federal policy therefore 
shifted from consent to coercion, with the finance minister adopting a notably different tone in 
his 1975 budget speech: “Since a consensus has not been reached, the government has had to 
examine a wide range of other options for dealing with the problems of inflation and 
unemployment” (Turner, 1975: 7020). The finance minister nevertheless signalled in his budget 
speech that he was strongly opposed to a politics of austerity: 
Among the various policy options open to us, there is one which this government has 
rejects, and rejects again, in the most categorical manner. This is the policy of 
deliberately creating, by severe measure of fiscal and monetary restraint, whatever level 
of unemployment is required to bring inflation to an abrupt halt. Such a course of action 
would be completely at odds with my own instincts. The cost would be much too high. 
The hard-won sense of security in our society would be replaced by a sense of fear and 
anxiety, and the cost in terms of lost output and lowered standards of living would be 
unacceptable. In human terms for me it would be unthinkable” (ibid: 7024). 
Tensions were nevertheless emerging within executive levels of the Liberal cabinet, and 
the timeline of events is worth noting. Finance minister Turner introduced his 1975 budget on 
June 13, signalling that stronger action needed to be taken to reduce inflation while taking a 
strong position against austerity. Then, on September 10, minister Turner resigned, citing 
personal reasons. Just one month after the resignation of minister Turner, on October 13, Prime 
Minister Trudeau went on national television to announce that “tomorrow, the government of 
Canada will ask Parliament for the authority to impose severe restraint upon rising prices and 





released a White Paper that ultimately triggered widespread class struggle in Canada. Titled 
“Attack on Inflation: A Program of National Action,” this White Paper called for sharp reforms 
along with wage and price controls across the country. It was only years later that finance 
minister Turner stated that he would rather quit than carry out the Liberal’s proposal for sharp 
monetary and fiscal restraint: “Turner admitted that he was frustrated by Trudeau’s attempts to 
undermine him on wage and price controls he was trying to implement” (Colby, 1975). This was 
a high-level executive struggle, with the Prime Minister prevailing. 
Turner explicitly recognized the material and distributional consequences of monetarism 
and fiscal austerity, seeking to use his power within the Cabinet as a means of resisting 
monetarist doctrines. Despite the fact that the Finance Minister opposed monetarist ideas and 
policies, his protest and power were trumped by his own Liberal Party. The Trudeau Liberals 
went on to implement severe monetary and fiscal restraint, and monetarism therefore prevailed in 
1975, not only by debasing existing Keynesian principles, but also because of the particular 
configuration of power within executive levels of government. The resignation of minister 
Turner clearly tipped the balance in favour of austerity and monetarism. To a degree, this 
moment could be considered a pivotal transition within power bloc (Mahon, 1977). As Mahon 
stressed, “the structure of representation is not conceived in a static, mechanical way but rather 
as the product of the class struggle as this has developed and is developing within a particular 
social formation” (165-66). Both the adoption of the Liberal White Paper and Bank of Canada 
governor Gerald Bouye’s “Saskatoon Manifesto” speech “ushered in a new era of Canadian 
monetary and fiscal policy” (Courchene, 1976).  
Both of these changes, however, were not introduced or implemented without substantial 
opposition. In order to reduce inflation through more coercive means, strict labour contract 





were not designed strictly to deal with inflation: “Governments introduce an incomes policy 
when the collective industrial power of workers threatens to redistribute the share of the national 
income from profits to wages and salaries” (1976: 5). And indeed, the Liberal government had 
previously attempted to introduce wage controls in the late 1960s because labour was growing 
too strong. George Haythorne, who was on the Prices and Incomes Commission at the time, gave 
the following explanation for why the state tried to introduce wage controls: “From 1957 to 1963 
the share of Canada’s national income going to profits and capital had risen steadily. The 
situation was reversed in 1964 when labour’s share began to rise, a trend which continued until 
1970. Give these conditions...action to stabilise the economy was clearly required” (citied in 
ibid: 5-6).  
The same principles applied in 1975 when the government successfully introduced wage 
and price controls under Prime Minister Trudeau. Utilizing “old” and “new” datasets from 
Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives’ economist Armine Yalnizyan (2010) 
detailed the share of income obtained by the richest one percent of Canadians between 1920 and 
2005. The share of income obtained by the top 1 per cent of income earners in Canada had 
reached record lows in the mid-to-late 1970s. Following the collapse of the Fordist 
organizational form in the 1970s, wealthy classes within Canada began to obtain an increasing 















Chart 1: Share of Total Income, Richest 1% Canada, 1920-2007 
 
SOURCE: Yalnizyan, Armine. 2010. "The Rise of Canada's Richest 1%." Canadian Centre for Policy  
Alternatives. 
 
A key executive barrier to fiscal and monetary restraint was overcome with the 
resignation of minister Turner, so the state could now go about adopting its anti-inflationary 
policies. One of the central conduits for imposing wage and price controls was the federally 
established Anti-Inflation Board. The Board was introduced with the Liberal White Paper with a 
mandate to introduce the controls. The Board quickly recognized the class-based dimensions of 
inflation and sought to weaken the strength of labour. To explain why the Board sought to tackle 
inflation by reducing the strength of labour, Marxist political economist Leo Panitch identified 
specific actors within the board, arguing that it was highly “inflated” with corporate interests 
(1976). Members of the Board held 11 corporate directorships between them: Board chairman 
Jean-Luc Pepin was involved in six private corporations; Jack Biddel worked with a private 
accounting firm, and Harold Renouf served as governor of the Canadian Tax Foundation. 





Trudeau Liberals were known for making patronage and partisan appointments to serve party 
interests (CBC, 2011). 
One of the 1979 Board reports noted that “market rigidities” helped sustained high rates 
of inflation. As the following statement illustrates, the Board is singling out labour as the 
primary contributor to these market rigidities: 
Some market rigidities can be traced to efforts to insulate a group or sector from adverse 
market pressures or to protect what were considered their essential economic interests. 
Organizations have been established with specific representational, non-economic 
purposes, but have come to have definite economic side effects. In either case the net 
result is an increase in the organization’s effective market power [….] In these cases, 
substantial market power permits the group affected to exercise some discretion over 
prices, fees, or wages, relatively independently of underlying supply and demand 
factors.” (AIB 1979b: 44) 
The logic of the Board is very clear. Organized labour has managed to increase its 
“effective market power,” and this power allows labour to “exercise some discretion over prices, 
fees, or wages.” The Board is implicitly recognizing the strength of organized class power here. 
There is also a clear desire on the part of the Board to dismantle these rigidities, as wage and 
price increases were not moderating rapidly enough after 1974-75. The Board also felt that these 
market rigidities were often fostered or exacerbated with  “the assistance or acquiescence of 
governments” (AIB 1979b: 45). In essence, the Board was subtly accusing the government of 
assisting or acquiescing to organized labour. 
Insofar as these fiscal and monetary policies amounted to an attack on organized labour, 
opposition began to emerge in the early 1970s as the anti-inflationary agenda took hold. The 





economy in the 1960s and 1970s. Strike and lockout activity began to increase sharply as 
corporate power began to introduce regressive contract offers that were implemented in 
conjunction with state fiscal and monetary restraint. Data from the International Labour 
Organization on the number of strikes in Canada between 1969 and 1991 (Chart 2 and 3) indicate 
that strike activity reached its height in 1974, with 1,218 strikes and lockout registered. The 
number of individuals taking part in strikes also jumped sharply in 1975. Thus, Canadian 
working class militancy reached its height during the introduction of monetarism. This was a 
clear struggle over the relationship between the state, capital and labour along fairly classical 
Fordist lines. As Soederberg argues, monetarism was “a political and ideological attempt to 
overcome defiance and attain compliance” (2001: 6). Just as Turner had stated in his 1975 
budget speech, the state was shifting from consensus to coercion. 
 
 

































Source: International Labour Organization. LABOURSTA. 9B. 
 
In the face of this strong working class opposition, the Anti-Inflation Board continued to 
implement broad wage and price controls across public and private sectors throughout the mid-
1970s. The Board began to fold up its operations in 1978, but only fully discontinued its work in 
1979. This was coupled with the general crisis of capital accumulation that had emerged in the 
early 1970s, with the OPEC crisis serving as a major contributing factor to the systemic crisis 
already underway. Indeed, Barsky (2004) shows that the global recession of the 1970s began 
before the oil price shock by two years.  
To summarize, the Liberal government attempted to introduce wage and price controls 
through consensus along corporatist lines in the early 1970s. Some suggest that attempts at 
obtaining consensus around wages and prices were merely a public gesture of goodwill for the 
inevitable austerity to come (Panitch, 1976), as the state shifted to more coercive measures by 

































government, as the Liberals could now approve of monetarist policies along with sharp wage and 
price controls. These policies were met with substantial working class resistance, with organized 
labour staging record levels of strike activity in 1975. 
This analysis contrasts in two critical ways with the prevailing constructivist account. 
Firstly, greater emphasis is placed upon the systemic crisis tendencies of capital, as I argue that 
monetarist ideas only gained a degree of salience because of the stagflationary pressures that 
emerged in the early 1970s. Secondly, ideas are still regarded as important, but greater emphasis 
is placed upon the class interests embedded in these ideas, and the class struggles waged around 
these ideas. Whereas constructivist scholars argue that monetarist ideas succeeded in the 1970s 
because broadly Keynesian ideas lost their sense of legitimacy, I argue that monetarist ideas 
succeed because they were supported by particular class interests within the Liberal Party. It 
would nevertheless take an additional two waves of monetary austerity for the state to achieve its 
desired fiscal and monetary objectives. 
By the early 1980s, new banking technologies and practices made it difficult for the 
central bank to target the rate of money growth and monetarism was officially abandoned in 
1982 (Laidler and Robson, 1994: 84-5). Monetarists nevertheless clung to the principles of their 
theory, arguing that the types of money being measured by the Bank of Canada were insufficient. 
The C.D. Howe Institute was once again a major advocate for this broader measure of monetary 
aggregates (Courchene, 1981; Laidler, 1993), sharing a view that was also widely disseminated 
in the daily press. The Chief Executive Officer of the Royal Bank of Canada, W. Earle 
McLaughlin, argued at the bank’s annual meeting in 1978 that the broadly defined monetary 
supply must be restrained in order to avoid spiralling inflation, and Globe and Mail columnist 
Wendie Kerr agreed with his assessment: “Measuring money supply at the M-1 level is 





there than a mere yardstick can measure” (1978). This attempt to sustain the dwindling 
legitimacy of monetarist models nevertheless failed. Former Bank Governor John Crow 
describes the demise of monetarism succinctly: 
…the M1 aggregates slowed drastically even as inflation was rising in the latter part of 
the 1970s. The targets were increasingly ignored both within the Bank and outside, and 
finally dropped in 1982. Or, as [Bank] Governor Bouey famously put it soon after: ‘We 
didn’t abandon M1, M1 abandoned us! (2009: 4) 
A window of opportunity had emerged with the abandonment of monetarism in 1982, and 
it was during this period that Bank of Canada economists Peter Jarret and Jack Selody developed 
their central thesis that “inflation is the single and most important explanatory variable in 
explaining slow (or negative) productivity growth” (cited in Seccariccia and Lavoie, 1996: 535). 
They also argued that varying levels of inflation distort price signals and therefore confuse 
information for investors, businesses, governments and individuals. Steady and predictable rates 
of inflation allow actors to make rational decisions based on the projected future value of 
currency, they argued. Monetary ideas were therefore shifting away from monetarism and toward 
a new concept of price stability. This concept of price stability was quickly adopted by senior 
officials within the Bank of Canada. John Crow, the soon-to-be-governor of the central bank, 
expressed this line of thinking very clearly:  
For my part, since I was concerned not to leave a policy vacuum that others might seek to 
fill in an unhelpful way, I was quick to set forth publicly my view that the central 
contribution of Canadian monetary policy to the nation’s economic wellbeing was to 
promote confidence in the future value of Canadian money by establishing and 





In order to establish a stable rate of inflation, however, existing high rates of inflation in 
the 1980s had to be brought under control. The Bank and the government therefore turned 
toward a period of heightened monetary restraint in order to achieve a desired rate of inflation. 




The Volcker Shock in Canada, 1977-82 
 
“The devaluation [of the dollar] is a direct vote of non-confidence by international investors in 
this Government's ability to manage the Canadian economy”—Progressive Conservative Party 
leader, Joe Clark, 1978. 
  
The global crisis that emerged in the early 1970s—combined with aggressive regulatory, 
fiscal and monetary policy—resulted in a significant reorientation in the organizational form of 
global and national capital. State responses to the global recession allowed corporate and 
financial classes to reassert a strong degree of class power. The term “reassert” is used 
deliberately here, insofar as the 1970s marked a return of capitalist class power which was 
subdued during the Fordist period. That is to say, the global crisis and subsequent policy 
responses further eroded “the shaky foundations of the Fordist accord” (Sangster, 2006), and as 
the Fordist organizational form began to erode, classical principles of free markets and free trade 
were reasserted under a new organizational form known as “neoliberalism,” which can be 
defined as: 
…a new configuration, domestic as well as international, in which the interests and power 
of capitalist ownership have been restored: a new discipline of labor and management (or 
corporate governance); deregulation in some respects (those contributing to the freedom 





fight against inflation); the financialization of capitalism (within the ‘nonfinancial’ 
sector, and as manifest in the rise of financial institutions); a determination to tap profits 
from workers in general and to pump income from the periphery along new lines. (2002: 
2) 
This reconfiguration of class power in the domestic and international economy had fairly 
direct implications for the conduct of monetary policy. Three particular class forces can be 
readily identified as having struggled over monetary policy: (1) finance capital, banks and 
international investors were a significant force by the late 1970s. As I argue below, finance 
capital served to discipline Canada in 1978 when policy deviated from market interests. It was 
only when the state adopted a clear anti-inflationary stance that markets began to react 
positively. (2) Corporate capital began to coalesce as a political force in the late 1970s. I cite 
government sources to argue that corporate capital did influence the conduct of fiscal and 
monetary policy in Canada. (3) Organized labour remained an influential force in Canadian 
politics despite their considerable defeats in the mid-1970s. I argue that broadening popular 
opposition to monetary austerity in the 1970s effectively swayed the Liberal opposition party to 
denounce high interest rates. The remainder of this section will detail the manner in which these 
class powers influence the conduct of monetary policy in Canada. 
 
Finance Capital 
Whereas speculative capital did play a role during the monetarist era, the transition away 
from Fordism effectively freed capital to flow across states. These changes in the organizational 
structure of global capital were brought on by the abandonment of the U.S. dollar as the global 
reserve currency in 1971. Moving from a fixed to floating exchange rate meant that international 





investors, banks, and speculators rapidly expanded markets that would allow  them to buy and 
sell currencies on an around-the-clock basis” (McNally, 2010: 93). Investors and banks could 
therefore capitalize by rapidly shifting to invest in currencies with high yields. The rapid 
expansion of currency trading in the 1970s served to increase the power of financial, banking and 
investment capital. States could now be disciplined by the markets. This is precisely what 
happened on a global scale when the United States sought to balance its current account deficit. 
The chairman of the Federal Reserve at the time, Paul Volcker, set a course to raise 
interest rates to whatever level was necessary in order to curb the inflationary side of the ongoing 
stagflation problem. This policy came to be known as the “Volcker Shock” (Bond, 2008), as the 
global economy was thrown into the worst recession since the Great Depression. Some argue 
that Canada was simply dragged along by monetary policy decisions made in the United States 
(Crow, 2009). Nothing could be further from the truth. Bank of Canada Senior Deputy Governor 
Bill Lawson recalled that personnel at the Bank “approved strongly of what the United States 
was doing” (cited in Babad, 1995: 185). The Bank essentially mirrored interest rate increases 
being made in the United States in order to reduce inflation. The prime interest rate was raised to 
a record 22.75 percent—a rate unparalleled in Canadian history—and these excessively high 
rates in the early 1980s were a major root-cause of the 1981 recession (see Chart 4). Monetarists 
confirm this general assessment. Howitt, for example, argues: 
There are several factors that can account for the 1981-82 recession. One of the most 
important of these is monetary policy. Sometime in 1981, the Bank of Canada decided 
that its approach to fighting inflation had been too gradual, too gentle. Its attempt to fight 
inflation with relatively little cost in lost output had obviously failed. After six years of 





decided that a much stronger does of monetary restraint was needed, even if this resulted 
in a recession. (1986: 76) 
 
 
Source: Statistics Canada. CANSIM II. Table 176-0043. 
 
The Bank and the government therefore set out to impose a very sharp dose of fiscal and 
monetary restraint in order to induce a state-backed recession. Unemployment levels reached 
highs of 12.8 per cent, the highest level since the Great Depression. Elites within government 
and the Bank of Canada were well aware of the class-based dimensions of the policies they were 
introducing. Bank governor Gerald Bouey approvingly noted that wage and salary increases 
were declining sharply as Canadians are now taking “more realistic attitudes towards increases in 
money incomes” (Barnes, 1978a). During a testimony to the House of Commons in 1978 also 





















































































levels, but Bouey “refused to give inquiring MPs a detailed estimate of the impact of the bank 
rate increase on unemployment, although he said it would probably have a negative impact in the 
short term” (Simpson, 1978a). 
Indeed, a newspaper report published in 1978 notes that “politicians and economists in 
Ottawa are well aware of the consequences of their recent actions, but they feel the measures are 
needed to restrain inflation and inflationary expectations” (78-09-14). The Anti-Inflation Board 
also approved of high interest rates and fiscal austerity as being a “significant” contributing 
factors to downward pressure on inflation rates (Editorial, 1978a). The Board went on to note 
that lowering real incomes was a necessary means of reducing inflation. The policies of the 
Volcker era were therefore always explicitly designed to reduce wage gains and slow the 
economy by raising the rate of unemployment. These were deemed as unfortunate but necessary 
consequences in the fight against inflation. 
It is also clear that finance capital served as a coercive influence upon the Bank of 
Canada and the elected government during this time. The influence of finance capital during this 
period of monetary austerity in Canada became apparent in 1978. As the national economy 
began to contract because of rising interest rates and budgetary tightening, senior officials within 
the Finance Department anonymously spoke with the press after releasing a report on the 
Canadian economy. They challenged prevailing government policies of austerity, arguing that 
national growth rates would decline if the government continued to impose sharp austerity 
measures (Cheveldayoff, 1978b). When the government began to take these concerns seriously 
by placing a higher priority on economic expansion and reducing unemployment, speculators 
started to withdraw their investments from Canada. 
Indeed, speculative flight away from the Canadian dollar defined 1978, as the value of 





a disciplinary function upon the state, insofar as investors could signal their discontent with the 
government for not tackling inflation aggressively enough. Again, this particular use of class 
power was only possible because of the neoliberal organizational form that global and national 
capital had assumed. The abandonment of the Bretton Woods system allowed investors to 
speculate on national currencies. Finance capital would not have been able to exert this kind of 
influence over monetary policy during the Fordist era, given that most currencies were pegged in 
relation to the American dollar under the Bretton Woods system. 
As the value of the Canadian dollar continued to decline in 1978, a sharp debate within 
the House of Commons emerged over the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy. Progressive 
Conservative opposition leader Joseph Clark accused the Liberal majority government of 
economic mismanagement. He argued that “the devaluation is a direct vote of non-confidence by 
international investors in this Government’s ability to manage the Canadian economy” (Editorial, 
1978c). In other words, the opposition leader recognized that international finance could 
influence the course of policy by withdrawing funds or refraining from investment. Such was the 
power of speculative capital that opposition parties could use evidence of capital flight to call for 
policy reform. 
This placed the Liberal Party in a difficult position, as they were losing popular appeal as 
unemployment and inflation continued to rise in the late 1970s. Prime Minister Trudeau 
therefore publicly declared that he would not attempt to further reduce unemployment levels, 
arguing that the provincial governments would focus on expansionary fiscal measures instead 
(ibid). The Prime Minister aimed to send a clear message to investors that the Canadian state 
would be pursuing policies of monetary and fiscal restraint. The state would be targeting the 






The Canadian dollar immediately began to appreciate after this statement, as investors 
were encouraged by rising interest rates and a sharp reduction in the federal deficit. In effect, 
investors were now confident that the government had sided with their class interests. The 
sentiment in early 1978 is well captured in a Globe & Mail column published at the time: 
…it appears clear that the authorities are now earnestly intent on terminating the 
persistent instability and chronic devaluation that have plagued the currency for the last 
20 months. A general belief that Ottawa is determined to stabilize the dollar would, in 
itself, help to dispel the uncertainty. During the past several months speculative pressure 
against the currency was strengthened by the belief—which was founded on public 
statements by the Minister of Finance—that the Government planned to do nothing to 
stop the persistent depreciation. (Anderson, 1978b) 
Notable about this period is the reconfiguration of class struggle that had occurred. 
During the monetarist period, class struggle was principally waged around wage and contract 
settlements. Increasing union militancy during the monetarist period was largely a response to 
the more aggressive stance taken by businesses and the state itself, which had shifted from 
consent to coercion. This had changed by the late 1970s. The struggle was now between 
domestic civil servants intent on sustaining economic growth and international finance, which 
was intent of seeking out high economic yields within an increasingly internationalized and 
financialized marketplace.  
 
Corporate Capital 
The increasing power of corporate capital also found its expression at the national level 
during this time, with banking and corporate interests coalescing to exert increasing political 





of Canada’s most powerful corporations and banks banded together in 1978 to form the Business 
Council on National Issues. According to Alfred Powis, the retired CEO of Imperial Oil and 
chairman of BCNI, the council was designed to “influence the public and the governments to 
follow policies we regard as sound for the economy” (List, 1978a). Powis recognized that class 
struggle was at the heart of the BCNI’s efforts. He stated that “if the balance of power goes too 
far in either direction, it would lead to difficulties. Our view is that the CLC [Canadian Labour 
Congress] underrates labor’s power” (ibid). The council included media corporations like Power 
Corporation along with all of the major Canadian national banks. The BCNI also established a 
research branch that published and circulated material in the late 1970s regarding the impacts of 
inflation upon Canadian business. Tony Clarke notes that BCNI quickly emerged “as the single 
most important and effective voice of Corporate Canada inside Ottawa” (1997: 22). 
The increasing concentration of economic and political power within coalescing 
corporate and financial interests resulted in a strong power block exerting influence over the 
executive and disciplining the state through financial channels. Mahon stresses how this power 
bloc can emerge over time: 
An alliance of the dominant classes in the power bloc – ‘a contradictory unit of politically 
dominant classes and fractions under the protection of the hegemonic fraction’ – is 
achieved partly through ‘private’ agencies like national manufacturers’ associations and 
‘core institutions’ (corporations whose boards bring together representatives of a variety 
of leading corporations)” (168). 
There are signs that these class interests influenced monetary policy decisions. Clarke 
noted that both the BCNI and the C.D. Howe Institute “waged a vigorous campaign to keep the 
government’s focus on fighting inflation rather than unemployment, arguing that keeping input 





(ibid: 25). As signs of the failure of monetarism were evident by 1977, vested interests began to 
actively lobby to insure that the government did not return to its broadly Keynesian principles 
from the 1960s. Doing so would effectively reverse their recent gains in class power. The 
sentiments of these coalescing corporate and financial classes were well-expressed by Bank of 
Montreal chairman, Fred McNeil, with the bank sitting as a prominent member on the newly 
formed BCNI. An extract from the Globe & Mail is worth quoting in full: 
Problems will only worsen if the federal Government switches from a policy of primarily 
battling inflation to one of battling unemployment, according to Fred McNeil, chairman 
of the Bank of Montreal. Fundamental goals of increased employment and income will be 
achieved to the extent that the battle against inflation is won, he said. These facts must be 
remembered in the context of pressures, from the media and others who should know 
better, to ‘do something,’ invariably of an inflationary nature, about unemployment, he 
told the bank’s annual meeting. […] Mr. McNeil generally praised the federal 
Government for its current economic policy stance. (Barnes, 1978b). 
 The government and state administers were critically aware of the influence that 
business wielded within the state and adjusted policy accordingly. Jean Chretien, who was 
serving as Finance Minister in 1978, noted that a group of businesspeople has met with Prime 
Minister Trudeau in 1978 and approved of his policy of not increasing government spending 
(King, 1978). Economists within the Finance Department also stressed that the government must 
avoid “adverse business reaction” by “ensuring that spending restraint is enhanced as they pursue 
higher deficits to stimulate the economy” (Cheveldayoff, 1978a). In other words, this coalescing 
group of powerful corporate institutions did influence state policy to some degree, demanding 





Even as the Bank of Canada and the elected government pursued sharper austerity 
measures, many in the business community argued the state was not going far enough. Albert 
Friedberg, vice-president of Friedberg and Co. Ltd. of Toronto, issued a report arguing that 
efforts at monetary restraint were being curtailed by the creation of new public sector jobs. A 
news article about the report stated that, “unless draconian economic measures are taken, Canada 
is headed for a long and painful bout of inflation” (Stephens, 1978). This was in 1978, during the 




While corporate and financial classes were resurgent in the late 1970s, organized labour 
remained a considerable class force. Strike activity remained at record high levels throughout the 
period, with over 1,000 strikes and lockouts recorded for each year between 1975 and 1981 
(Charts 2 and 3). As monetary austerity began to really take hold, counter-powers emerged 
against this significant monetary consensus within the elected government and across business 
and financial classes. At the annual Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) convention in 1978, 
outgoing president Joseph Morris warned that provincial and federal governments were intent on 
restricting workers income and collective labour freedoms (List, 1978b). Morris stated bluntly 
that: 
The economy will continue to deteriorate and jobs will continue to be lost. With this 
decline will come ever increasing attacks by governments on wages which they blindly 
believe cause inflation. Just as the federal Government’s infamous AIB [Anti-Inflation 
Board] failed to control inflation through its relentless and obsessive battle against 






Speculative downward pressure on the dollar continued as the leader of the New 
Democratic Party (NDP), Edward Broadbent, argued that monetary policy was freezing the 
economy and increasing unemployment rates (Simpson, 1978b). Interest rates increased rapidly 
through the late 1970s as links between the NDP and the CLC deepened with the acclimation of 
Dennis McDermott to CLC president. McDermott was blunt about his intent to fight the 
government’s policy agenda: “you don’t radicalize people until you kick them in the ass. And 
we’ve been kicked hard. And that tends to get rid of those moral differences that exist…now 
even the biggest among us recognize you can’t go it alone - that you need a strong and viable 
labour congress” (Editorial, 1978b). 
Popular and organized opposition to the Volcker-era monetary policies mounted with 
each increase in the interest rate. Interest rates continued to climb through 1978 and 1979, 
exceeding historical records at 12 percent and only plateauing at a staggering 21 per cent in 
1981. Personal and business bankruptcies began to surge in the 1980s and manufacturing job 
losses numbered in the tens of thousands (Willoughby, 1981). 
Social forces coalesced against these policies from disparate corners. A report published 
by the Canadian Federation of Independent Business noted that high interest rates were a major 
concern for business-owners struggling to receive cheap credit and pay down loans, so small 
businesses therefore began to speak out against increasing rates (Cheveldayoff, 1979). This stood 
in sharp contrast with the opinion of larger multinationals, with executives arguing that interest 
rates should be increased to mitigate inflation. At a business outlook seminar organized by the 
Conference Board of Canada in 1981, executives argued that high interest rates needed to be 
maintained for at least another three years (Cox, 1981). 
The attitudes of conflicting social forces did influence the course of party politics in 





voted to change their position on rising rates. The party had strongly supported rising rates while 
in power under Trudeau, but the 1979 federal election resulted in a Progressive Conservative 
minority government with the Liberal Party serving as the primary opposition party. Once out of 
power, the Liberals revised their position on the Bank of Canada from supporting to opposing 
high interest rates (Globe, 1979).  
The minority status of the Progressive Conservatives also served to somewhat weaken the 
strength of the elected government. For example, a motion from the Liberal opposition to 
investigate the high interest rates gave opposition parties the upper hand within the House of 
Commons Committee tasked to review central bank policy. A report in the Globe & Mail noted 
that: 
Because the Government is outnumbered in the House of Commons, it is likely to have a 
minority position on the finance committee and the Liberals and New Democrats will 
hope to use their position of power to write a committee report condemning the 
Government’s interest-rate policy and to remind the Government, as it did often 
yesterday, of its criticism of high rates when it was in Opposition before the May 22 
election. (Rusk, 1979) 
Given that both the NDP and the Liberal Party opposed high rates, the opposition parties 
could effectively pass a vote of non-confidence in the Progressive Conservatives and trigger a 
federal election. A vote along these lines would require that opposition parties weigh their 
options, as they would only trigger an election if their confidence in winning was strong enough. 
This vote of non-confidence was not to happen, suggesting that opposition parties did not believe 
they could win a snap election. 
Pressure on the elected government and the central bank continued to mount into the 





was a group of nationally organized debt incumbent homeowners. High interest rates were 
causing homeowners to default on their mortgages or to suffer sharp rises in interest rates on 
their mortgages. “The new rates will have their most serious impact on young families who have 
just purchased houses with short-term mortgages,” noted a report in the Globe & Mail. “High 
unemployment areas such as British Columbia, where layoffs are expected from major strikes, 
are expected to suffer the most. Young families face serious jumps in mortgage charges as their 
one-year mortgages come up for renewal at even more unmanageable levels” (Willoughby, 
1981).  
As the rates continued to exceed historical precedents into the late 1970s, homeowners 
began to organize. Over 800 homeowners gathered in Toronto to organize against the interest 
rate hikes. “Although proponents of a number of sometimes bewildering schemes to reduce high 
interest rates vied for the allegiance of the crowd, most people were convinced that escalated 
public protest was the only effective course of action,” a news article on the event noted (Globe, 
1981). Several isolated protests were held across the country and outside the Bank of Canada 
offices in Ottawa. A rally in protest against the high rates was organized in Edmonton in late 
November, 1981, and the protest drew over 1,000 people—with labour leaders, NDP members of 
parliament and homeowners demanding that interest rates be reduced (ibid). 
The agricultural sector also began to organize against the high rates. Rural and 
agricultural militancy has historically represented a significant social force in Canadian political 
affairs, serving as the electoral and militant base of North America’s first socialist party (Reimer, 
2010). The Canadian Federation of Agriculture became an assertive force as farm bankruptcies 
mounted and an increasing number of livestock owners fell into financial hardship. Agriculture 





frustrations were growing high. “We respect you but it’s a good thing the Minister of Finance 
didn’t come with you,” one of the farmers told the minister (Cox, 1981). 
Despite increasing agitation and opposition from an array of social forces, interest rates 
remained high and the national economy fell into recession. It was only when the recession 
began to seriously affect the national economy and erode support for the reigning government 
that politicians and officials at Bank of Canada sought to reverse their politics of monetary 
austerity. In order to ease monetary policy, however, the Bank first needed to work with other 
international actors to compel the United States to ease its Volcker Shock policies. The U.S. 
Federal Reserve remained the central fulcrum of global monetary policy, with its interest rates 
exerting strong influence over the rates of other national currencies (Panitch and Gindin, 2009). 
The Federal Reserve and state leaders therefore had to be convinced that their policies 
were excessive and must be reversed. Bank governor Gerald Bouey “forcefully” expressed his 
fears of sustained monetary restraint during a meeting with members of the 10 most powerful 
global economies (the G10), which was held at the Bank for International Settlements in 
Switzerland in 1981. During the meeting, Bouey said that “we will all be shovelling out money 
soon by the bucketful to save failed businesses” unless the United States eases its monetary 
policy (Crow, 2009). International pressure on the United States continued to mount into 1982, 
and the U.S. finally began to ease its policy of monetary restraint “to significant relief at the 
Bank of Canada” (ibid). 
Having reviewed the class struggle waged during this time, it is worth stressing two key 
differences between the monetarist and Volcker Shock periods. First, whereas class struggle was 
centred around wage restraint introduced by the Trudeau government in the mid-1970s, the class 
dynamics of the Volcker era became one-step removed from immediate class struggle. No longer 





introduced across all sectors of society in a highly diffuse and uneven manner. Panitch highlights 
this difference clearly: 
...when the Government increases interest rates, the individual worker and his family are 
on their own in paying more for credit or higher mortgage payments. Incomes policy, 
however, only operates by acting on workers collectively, in that it seeks to modify the 
wage bargaining behaviour of their whole group, as expressed through their union. Thus 
the union is the direct object of an incomes policy. (1976: 20) 
Inflation-control rather than wage control therefore avoided direct class struggle with 
organized labour. This advantage did not go unnoticed by the Bank of Canada. Former Bank 
economist and deputy governor Charles Freedman, for example, applauded the inflation-
targeting regime for its ability to reduce the number of workdays lost to strikes (cited in Mann, 
2010: 16). 
Second, the erosion of the Fordist organizational form also entailed a reconfiguration of 
class forces. Speculative capital exerted strong influence over the conduct of monetary policy 
and government affairs following the demise of the Bretton Woods system. The deepening 
integration between economies of the United States and Canada also imposed a structural 
limitation on the Canadian state and central bank to conduct its affairs independently. The state 
was not as heavily exposed to these external pressures under the Fordist organizational form. It 
would nevertheless take one final wave of monetary austerity for the Bank of Canada to finally 




“The 1980s policies of attacking inflation by squeezing the economy and public spending were a 





strength of the working class. What was engineered—in Marxist terms—was a crisis of 
capitalism, which re-created a reserve army of labour, and has allowed the capitalists to make 
high profits ever since”—Alan Budd, economic advisor to Margaret Thatcher.  
	
The neoliberal organizational form had already begun to ossify in the late 1980s, when 
the final phase in this struggle over monetary policy unfolded. Incoming Bank Governor John 
Crow introduced another wave of high interest rates that spurred yet another state-backed 
recession in 1990. Unlike the Volcker era, when opposition to monetary policy developed 
slowly, opposition to Crow’s policies were widespread from their inception. Crow virtually 
mounted a one-man crusade against high interest rates in what is now referred to as the Crow 
Doctrine. Upon entering office, Crow said that “the Bank set out of its stall early, and pursued 
the objective of inflation reduction with consistent focus – a single-mindedness that at the time 
seemed praiseworthy to some and noxious to many” (Crow, 2009: 6). This final section will 
elaborate upon the manner in which this pursuit was conducted, the particular social forces that 
organized around these policies, and the juridical powers accorded to the Bank that allowed the 
governor to pursue sharp monetary austerity. 
Crow took his seat as Governor of the Bank of Canada during a period of widespread 
economic uncertainty. Stock markets had crashed in 1987, and there was talk that Canada would 
be dragged into a recession. The state had nevertheless largely recovered from its self-induced 
recession of the early 1980s, and it was under these conditions that outgoing Governor Gerald 
Bouey tendered his resignation. A retrospective piece that appeared in the Montreal Gazette on 
the day of his retirement noted that “when Bouey squeezed, he hurt. Businesses went under. 
People were thrown out of work. Some of them called Bouey and told him what a son-of-a-bitch 
he was.” Asked in the same article how he maintained such austere monetary policies, Bouey 





people. I don’t think I’d want to go any further than that” (Editorial, 1987a). However, the 
struggle against inflation was not over in the eyes of the central bank. 
As the incoming Bank Governor, Crow feared that inflation was creeping into the 
economy again by the late-1980s. Wage demands were increasing, with several major public 
union wage settlements approaching. The Progressive Conservative government under Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney echoed these concerns about inflation, going further to situate fiscal 
restraint as a key pillar of their economic policy (McQuaig, 1995: 73). In order to understand the 
impending class struggle that was to emerge, however, the particular organizational form of 
Canadian capital must first be developed. An article published in the Ottawa Citizen recognized 
that class struggle was likely to emerge in Canada, and the article accurately depicts the 
organizational form that prevailed in the late 1980s: 
Canadian labor has never been known as a pussycat. 
Quite the contrary, Canadian labor unions were pictured by international investors in the 
mid-70s as the bad boys of unionism. 
They had one of the worst records in the world for time lost because of strikes and 
lockouts. And the settlements they exacted during the early 70s were way ahead of the 
gains in productivity. […] 
But how times have changed. Work stoppages now place Canada roughly in the middle 
rank among major industrial countries. Total time lost from stoppages is only slightly 
ahead of the United States at about half of one per cent of all time worked. 
Two shots of wage controls in the last 12 years coupled with the longest and deepest 
recession in 50 years and sharp declines in prices for oil, grains and other commodities 





Rather than bargain for hefty wage increases, unions increasingly found themselves 
fighting rearguard actions to protect jobs and hold off management demands for contract 
givebacks. (Ferguson, 1987) 
 In other words, the first two waves of monetary, fiscal and regulatory austerity had 
significantly weakened the strength of labour and the working class by the late 1980s. Labour 
also faced a Progressive Conservative government under Prime Minister Mulroney that was 
staunchly in favour of neoliberal doctrines, putting labour at a significant disadvantage relative to 
the strength of capital as the Crow Doctrine of high interest rates were being introduced.  
The doctrine emerged largely as a result of the aforementioned “policy vacuum” that had 
opened up with the failure of monetarism and the subsequent wave of monetary austerity under 
the Volcker Shock. Crow was quick to fill this policy vacuum by fostering substantial research 
on the work of price stability upon entering office in 1987 (Crow, 2009). This research led to the 
development of a new monetary policy known as “inflation targeting.” Inflation targeting entails 
altering interest rates in order to keep inflation within a narrow operating band of between 1 and 
3 per cent. Canada and New Zealand were the first countries to adopt inflation targets in 1991 
(Lavoie and Seccareccia, 1996), and Canada has subsequently renewed the policy four times. In 
order for the central bank to achieve its inflation target, however, existing inflation rates had to 
be further reduced.  
One of the definitive moments of this third wave of restraint was Crow’s 1988 Eric J. 
Hanson Memorial Lecture at the University of Alberta. Speaking to a group of students, Crow 
revived monetarist rhetoric in his speech in proclaiming that “monetary policy should be 
conducted so as to achieve a pace of monetary expansion that promotes price stability in the 





was effectively working to lock inflation targeting into the core mandate of the central bank. 
Linda McQuaig, a critical journalist and writer, noted the significance of this effort: 
In many ways, this represented a crucial turning point, a final abandonment of any notion 
that the Bank had a responsibility to balance the interest of all members of society. There 
was a perennial clash between the interest of those primarily concerned with fighting 
inflation and those primarily concerned with keeping the economy buoyant and crowing. 
This is a simplified characterization; the country didn’t divide neatly into these two 
fractions. Most people wanted both low inflation and a growing economy. But, more than 
was generally appreciated, these goals were often in conflict. (1995: 79) 
There are four factors that distinguish the Crow Doctrine period from the previous two 
waves of monetary restraint. The first is the zeal with which Crow almost single-handedly 
pursued the goal of implementing Canada’s inflation target. The second is the particular 
organizational form of domestic and international capital, which allowed the Bank to purse the 
Crow Doctrine despite widespread domestic opposition. Third, the juridical power accorded to 
the central bank allowed Crow to conduct policies independently from democratic influence. 
Fourth, the muted but vital support that Crow received from the elected Progressive Conservative 
government, and finance minister Michael Wilson in particular. Each of these points will be 
addressed in turn. 
Regarding the first point, Crow pursued the inflation targeting regime aggressively upon 
entering office. Crow initially sought to embed a policy of zero-inflation targeting within the 
Canadian Constitution, but this effort proved unpopular and unsuccessful. Instead, officials at the 
Bank of Canada and the Department of Finance adopted an accord in 1991 that allowed the Bank 





this control target with such zeal that broad segments of business and labour were opposed to his 
policy virtually from the outset.  
The Canadian Chamber of Commerce became the “first big business group to question 
the bank’s strong anti-inflationary stance,” according to a 1987 article in the Toronto Star 
(Editorial, 1987b). The Chamber briefed Finance Minister Michael Wilson, arguing that the 
central bank must ease its policy in order to deal with the expected economic slowdown. Adding 
to this opposition was the former president of the BCNI, Alf Powis, who likewise questioned the 
Crow Doctrine. Powis had become the chairman of resource giant Noranda Inc., which was 
heavily focused on forestry and mineral extraction. Powis told shareholders at an annual meeting 
that the Bank’s policies had artificially increased the value of the Canadian dollar, which made 
Canadian manufacturing and industrial products internationally uncompetitive (Editorial, 1988). 
This was the same man that argued in the late 1970s that the Bank of Canada should maintain a 
high interest rate environment. Times had indeed changed. 
Organized labour also strongly opposed the Crow Doctrine from its inception. Whereas 
labour had developed counter-powers at a very gradual pace during the Volcker era, labour 
reacted immediately to the Crow Doctrine and began to coalesce against this policy. The 
National Farmers Union argued strongly against these high rates to the House of Commons 
Agriculture Committee in 1988 (Globe, 1988); the national Woodworkers union were also 
spurred to “lash out” against these policies (Schreiner, 1988); local Canadian Auto Worker 
unions directly accused Crow of causing the indefinite layoffs of 403 Ford workers in 1990 
(Windsor, 1990), and CAW president Bob White also offered public condemnations of the 
Crow-era policies. Organized labour was indeed rebuilding after the two previous waves of 





Windsor Star newspaper in 1990 accurately describes the re-emergence of organized labour as a 
social force during this time: 
Following a decade-long retreat, union leaders regrouped in 1989, licked their wounds 
and prepared for the counter attack that could make 1990 the year of labor’s big push. 
The '80s had not been kind to the union movement. The decade began with a crippling 
recession that saw thousands of jobs lost and plants closed. Union leaders headed for the 
trenches to dig in on the line of ‘no concessions.’ Led by CAW president Bob White, 
labor held that line until the economic tide began to turn and the Canadian economy 
recovered. (Star, The Windsor, 1990) 
Opposition to the Crow Doctrine was not limited to corporate interests and a resurgent 
labour movement, however. Provincial leaders and opposition parties were likewise strongly 
opposed to the Crow Doctrine from its early stages. Opposition Members of Parliament would 
sharply criticize Crow’s policies during the Commons’ finance committee meetings, but the 
governor remained steadfast. As interest rates began to climb sharply in 1989, provincial finance 
treasurers also met with Finance Minister Michael Wilson to argue that interest rates were too 
high. The provincial leaders also argued that the finance minister should urge the Bank of 
Canada to bring rates down (Star, 1989). “Obviously the provinces will continue to put on the 
pressure but I don’t think he’s [Crow] going to succumb: He’s made that clear,” said Sherry 
Atkinson Cooper, chief economist with Burns Fry Ltd. (ibid).  
It may seem surprising that the Bank would pursue such sharp monetary austerity given 
that domestic class forces had aligned so strongly against the Crow Doctrine. However, the 
organizational form of Canadian capital in the late 1980s essentially expanded the terrain upon 
which class struggle was being waged. During the Fordist period, capital remained fairly 





throughout the Fordist period, as Chart 5 indicates. However, Canada became increasingly 
integrated into the global economy following the structural crisis of capital in the early 1970s. 
Exposure to global volatility increased following the crisis, and the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system in 1971 was critical to this deepening global integration of capital. 
 
Chart 5: Canada’s Vulnerability to Foreign Trade (Exports plus imports as a 
percentage of GDP, 1926-2002) 
 
Source: Seccareccia, Mario. 2007. “Critical Macroeconomic Aspects of Deepening North 
American Economic Integration”, Whose Canada? Continental Integration, Fortress North 
America, and the Corporate Agenda, ed. by R. Grinspun and Y. 
Shamsie, Montreal/Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press. pp 234-58. 
 
It is in this context that the Bank was able to pursue the Crow Doctrine despite 
widespread domestic opposition. The government had committed itself to establishing a two 
percent inflation target, which it promised to reach by 1995. International investors could 
therefore rest assured that returns on the Canadian dollar would be high for the foreseeable 





Japanese and German investors “are still interested in our markets, which look very attractive on 
a worldwide basis” (Hadekel, 1991). Investors therefore profited from the Crow Doctrine while 
domestic industry, businesses and households were squeezed. As Epstein argues in his 
international study of inflation targeting regimes, “a main effect of adopting inflation targeting, 
thus far, has been to reduce inflation and increase the share of income going to rentiers in many 
parts of the world” (2002: 5). 
With foreign capital flooding into Canada in search of short-term yields rather than 
productive investment, the purchase of Canadian currency increased demand for the Canadian 
dollar, causing an increase in the exchange rate (Friedland, 1988). Credit becomes more difficult 
to access for manufacturing industries and domestic businesses, while the purchase of Canadian 
commodities becomes less appealing as prices rise.  
The inverse also holds true. Decreasing interest rates in Canada would effectively cause 
investors to withdraw their money from Canada in search of higher yield elsewhere. “As things 
stand, money is free to rush from one country to another in search of higher short-term interest 
rates” (ibid). The flight of investors from Canada would increase the supply of Canadian 
currency, effectively lowering the Canadian exchange rate. Domestic manufacturing and 
business would benefit as credit would be cheaper, while Canadian goods and services would 
also become more competitive. However, the Bank of Canada and the Progressive Conservative 
government were deeply concerned about lowering rates. On the one hand, they feared prospects 
of inflation, and on the other hand, they had committed themselves to an inflation target of two 
per cent, which had to be achieved by 1991. 
Canada was not the only state in this situation. Group of Seven (G7) leaders from the 
seven most powerful global economies met in Paris on July 14, 1989, to discuss international 





that high interest rates would slow their national economies, the G7 was more afraid of inflation 
than recession (McGillivray, 1989). This consensus among global powers was expressed in a 
report by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which stated 
that “while monetary authorities will wish to avoid excessive tightening that would precipitate a 
downturn, they must nonetheless remain vigilant” (ibid). The OECD was effectively endorsing 
monetary austerity while cautioning that excessive tightening may cause a recession. 
 This does help explain why the Bank was able to impose the Crow Doctrine despite 
widespread domestic opposition. The globalization of financial capital meant that the Bank of 
Canada needed to retain high interest rates in order to attract short-term investments. 
International leaders in 1989 were also more concerned about mitigating chances of inflation 
than they were about fostering a state-backed recession. This was certainly the case for Canada, 
which had imposed upon itself an internal—and international—commitment to an inflation 
control target of two percent.  
Nevertheless, domestic opposition to central bank policy was widespread and 
increasingly hostile to these policies. How did the Bank manage to insulate itself from this 
increasing domestic pressure? The answer lies in the particular juridical powers accorded to the 
central bank. Central banks in most developed countries are accorded varying degrees of Central 
Bank Independence (CBI). CBI can be defined as providing central banks with the “authority to 
conduct monetary policy without interference or political pressure from the finance ministry or 
the government” (Bruce Hall, 2008: 1). Without CBI, the argument goes that governments may 
foster expansionary monetary policies during election periods or when their popularity is 
dwindling. Bank independence is designed to mitigate this possibility. This juridical division of 
power vests incredible authority in both the Bank governor and the elected government. The 





democratic influence. Political economist Geoff Mann calls this form of governance “punctuated 
totalitarianism,” insofar as the Bank is almost entirely free from democratic influence, aside from 
government-approved policy renewals and occasional conflicts of interest between the Bank and 
the elected government (2010: 8). 
 Should a sharp discrepancy emerge between the Bank and the elected government, 
ultimate authority rests with the government,1 and should this discrepancy reach a point in which 
the government demands that the Bank change its policy course, it is unstated practice that the 
Bank governor resign. This offers some indication of the extent to which Crow was pursuing his 
policy objectives. Provincial premiers were in widespread agreement that the federal government 
should “urge” the Bank governor to adopt lower interest rates. When Crow was asked by 
opposition MPs what he would do if this happened, Crow openly stated, “I would resign” 
(Dowling, 1988). He was therefore aware that pressure was mounting for his forced resignation, 
but Crow continued to implement sharp monetary austerity. 
 Central Bank Independence allowed Crow to pursue his policy aims despite widespread 
opposition from corporate interests, organized labour, opposition parties, provincial premiers and 
general discontentment among the public. Yet Crow relied critically upon the support from the 
Progressive Conservative government of the day. Crow’s views on the government’s position are 
worth quoting in full here. Crow argued that Finance Minister Wilson was: 
…fundamentally supportive of the clear anti-inflationary stance taken, because he 
thought that this was the way the world was going, and also the way it needed to go. 
However, some of his senior officials clearly were not so supportive, government in 










This makes clear that potential discrepancies can emerge between the Bank and the 
finance minister, with ultimate authority resting with the minister. A clear historical distinction 
can be drawn between the monetarist era under Liberal Finance Minister John Turner and that of 
Michael Wilson. Turner was opposed to monetarist principles being introduced by his own 
Liberal government and resigned when monetarism was introduced as policy. Conversely, Bank 
Governor John Crow drove interest rates so high that opposition to his policies grew widespread 
across seemingly conflicting vested interests (labour, corporate power, even the segments of the 
elected government). The government could have forced Crow to ease his policy stance, 
effectively insuring his resignation, but Progressive Conservative finance minister Michael 
Wilson was “fundamentally supportive” of Crow’s anti-inflationary stance between 1987 and 
1991. 
 The third and final wave of monetary restraint therefore hinges critically upon the 
importance of Central Bank Independence. CBI provided Crow with the legal autonomy to 
peruse his inflation-control targets by raising interest rates to whatever level was necessary to 
bring inflation within a desired target range. Inflation rates were indeed reduced to the desired 
range of between one and three percent, and the Bank of Canada subsequently adopted an 
agreement with the elected government to retain inflation levels within this target range. This 
inflation targeting regime was renewed in 2011 by the central bank in agreement with the elected 
government, and it will remain in place until 2016. In fact, the Bank noted in its statement of 
policy renewal that it is also conducting research of the possibility of setting an even lower target 
rate of inflation, which authors of the report claim will “provide significant net benefits to the 







“But even my most objective principles inevitably will reflect my own theoretical preconceptions, 
because economics is not an exact science and because the facts do not speak for themselves – 
people with different a priori views will interpret them differently.” (Howitt, 1986: 8) 
 
 This rare confession from an economist is refreshing, as rigorous economic assessments 
are indeed subject to political inclinations and interpretations. The three waves of monetary 
austerity that were introduced in Canada between 1975 and 1991 are no less rife with political 
substance, as economic ideas and policies were embedded with particular class interests. It is not 
enough, however, to simply identify the interests embedded in a given monetary idea or policy. 
These ideas and policy proposals require active political agency in order to be implemented. 
Where did this study take us? 
One of the principal themes of this study is that competing class interests do indeed 
influence the conduct of monetary policy reform and implementation. Far from being a 
politically benign process, monetary policy is heavily influenced by an evolving array class 
interests. The purpose of this study was to examine why the Bank of Canada adopted the anti-
inflationary policies that it did. On the surface, the Bank was simply responding to the global 
stagflationary crisis that emerged in the early 1970s, but there are two sides to the problem of 
stagflation: inflation and unemployment. State and central bank elites in Canada opted to fight 
against inflation rather than unemployment, so why did the state choose to tackle one side of the 
stagflation problem over the other? 
The two dominant approaches to this question—monetarism and constructivism—
downplay or overlook the class dynamics of monetary ideas and policies. As Lawson suggests 
with respect to monetarism, “the overall result is a conception wherein any contribution of 





conclusions of this paper is that individuals are not only capable of making their own history, but 
that individuals are also capable of coming together as a class in order to express and struggle for 
a common will.  
And while constructivist scholars do not overlook class to the same degree, much of the 
literature does effectively downplay the role of class in shaping economic ideas and policy 
outcomes. Constructivists like Lewis argue that “the rightward shift in politics both at the elite 
level in the 1980s and the mass level in the 1990s explains most of what went wrong during the 
1990s and finally overcame whatever residual Keynesian thinking remained within policy 
circles” (Chorney, 2004: 253). This emphasis on a rightward shift in economic thinking 
overlooks the class forces that actively fostered this shift through policy channels. 
Rather than placing emphasis on a shift in thinking, I argue that Canada’s anti-
inflationary policies emerged as a result the systemic crisis of capital and the subsequent 
reconfiguration of class forces. Three principal factors can be identified as contributing to this 
change in monetary policy and ideas: first, a given mode of production will structurally 
constrain—but not limit—the ideas and policy options considered. Capitalist modes of 
production will invariably be more receptive to ideas and policies which foster economic growth, 
whereas feudal or slave-based modes of production will favour ideas conductive to outright 
exploitation. 
Secondly, the capital accumulation cycle has an innate tendency to fluctuate through 
waves of boom and bust, and these structural crises have an impact upon prevailing economic 
ideas and monetary policies. This was certainly the case for the global crisis that emerged in the 
early 1970s, as the dual problem of high inflation and unemployment spurred a radical 





Third, the organizational form of global and national capital is constantly evolving. 
Organized labour was a powerful social force in the mid-1970s, but their power began to recede 
in the 1980s and 1990s to ascendant financial and corporate classes. These changing class 
configurations will influence—but not determine—which monetary ideas prevail and are adopted 
as state policy. In the Canadian case, organized labour and other agents of opposition were not 
sufficiently powerful to challenge the anti-inflationary agenda. Monetary policy served to 
discipline individuals and groups by raising interest rates to extreme levels. The Bank 
deliberately induced state-backed recessions in the early 1980s and 1990s as a means of 
achieving a desired rate of inflation. These policies benefited banks, lenders and investors who 
profited from high interest rates, while disciplining individuals and businesses that relied on 
loans for mortgages, basic purchases and business development.  
Another important change in the organizational form of global capital was the 
introduction of floating exchange rates in 1971, which effectively increased the power of finance 
capital. The effects of this organizational change were evident in Canada when investors placed 
strong downward pressure on the dollar as markets deemed that the state was not tackling 
inflation and state deficits aggressively enough. This level of market influence would not have 
been possible under the former Keynesian organizational model. 
It must be stressed that these labour struggles and class reconfigurations were not 
geographically even across Canada. Rather, class struggle and reconfigurations of class power 
occurs unevenly across regions, provinces and scales. Indeed, Jessop notes that more recent 
iterations of the regulation school have accounted more carefully for spatial variation along with 
the importance of scalar production, reproduction and change (1997: 507). As Jessop notes: 
Regarding the scales of regulation, the Parisian school has begun to shift its focus (albeit 





work, it was usually to consider complementarities among different national economies and/or to 
enquire how international regimes helped stabilise the external conditions for national 
accumulation regimes. This prioritisation of the national economy and its national state may 
explain why the early RA showed little concern with local, urban and regional spaces of 
regulation or, except for the grenoblois school, with supranational economic spaces (ibid: 511)  
One weakness of this study is that the uneven regional and scalar reconfigurations of 
class power and struggle were not accounted for. The class struggles depicted in this study were 
largely at the national scale of analysis, yet interventions from farmers, provincial Premiers and 
home owners all indicate the importance of capturing scalar and regional variation within the 
contested terrain of monetary policy. 
Also notable about all three waves is the significant power wielded by the elected 
government and officials at the Bank of Canada. The government and the Bank were capable of 
sustaining sharp monetary restraint during each of these three waves despite widespread and 
powerful opposition from a shifting array of class powers. While the strength of class-based 
opposition varied in strength from one wave to the next, the government and the Bank retained a 
dominant position with respect to policy implementation. Political economist Geoff Mann thus 
correctly argues that “monetary policy-making [is] characterized by what one might call periodic 
democracy – or punctuated totalitarianism,” in which the Bank is largely removed from 
democratic influence (2010: 8). The struggle over monetary policy is therefore once removed 
from immediate policy influence. Instead, competing class interests largely influence monetary 
policy through the markets. This puts finance capital in a privileged position, insofar as 








This study does critique the constructivist account, which has gained increasing traction 
since the 1990s. While ideas are still regarded as critical, emphasis is instead placed upon the 
class forces that foster these ideas and attempt to influence political and economic outcomes. I 
argue that an idea can only influence policy if it is supported by particular social forces. In this 
case, monetary ideas and policies are inherently embedded with class politics. A given monetary 
policy or idea will invariably have consequences for the distribution of profit and economic 
power. Actors in a position to influence these ideas and policies are therefore class agents. 
Former Finance Minister John Turner fought for the interests of working classes, while former 
Bank Governor John Crow favoured anti-inflationary policies that had serious consequences for 
working people. 
Constructivist scholarship nevertheless offers essential insights into the conduct of 
monetary policy and the social sciences more generally, and it must be stressed that scholars of 
both Marxist and constructivist traditions are moving toward greater levels of theoretical 
hybridity. There are constructivist scholars that take class into account (Blyth, 2001), just as 
there are Marxists who integrate the role of ideas into their analysis (Soederberg, 2001). I did 
seek to critique constructivism while offering an alternative framework, but I regard this study as 
contributing to a debate that will hopefully bring conflicting theories closer together.  
A similar move toward theoretical synthesis is also necessary with respect to Marxism 
itself. The structure-agency debate shows no signs of disappearing from academic inquiry (Bieler 
and Morton, 2008; Blyth, et al., 2009), but studies are increasingly moving toward frameworks 
that account for both structure and agency (Jessop, 2005; Jessop, 2008). As Jessop argues in 





relation to action, [and] action in relation to structure, rather than bracketing one of them” (2005: 
48). Jessop goes on to argue that: 
Structures are thereby treated analytically as strategically-selective in their form, content, 
and operation; and actions are likewise treated as structurally constrained, more or less 
context-sensitive, and structuring. To treat structures as strategically-selective involves 
examining how a given structure may privilege some actors, some identities, some 
strategies, some spatial and temporal horizons, some actions over others. (ibid) 
In this study, I argued that capital structurally constrained—but did not determine—the 
spectrum of monetary ideas, policies and outcomes during a given time. Thus, ideas and policy 
options will be influenced by structural conditions, just as ideas and policy options can influence 
the manner in which structures evolve.  
One of the main theoretical contributions of this paper is to highlight the importance of 
how shifting organizational forms can influence which class forces and ideas have more power 
and influence over others. A given organizational form of capital does indeed privilege some 
actors, strategies and ideas over others. In this case, the structural crisis of capitalism in the early 
1970s resulted in the fragmentation of the Fordist organizational form. The emergent neoliberal 
organizational form privileged increasingly internationalized corporate and financial classes. 
Prospects and Directions 
There are movements underway that will likely reconfigure the organizational forms of 
global and national capital and its class formations. European and North American economies 
are stalling while emerging economies now account for roughly two thirds of global economic 
growth following the crisis (Greenwood, 2012). The framework applied in this study could be 





role of monetary policy and its class dimensions could also be studied using the framework 
employed in this study. 
Greater dialogue and theoretical synthesis between constructivist and Marxist scholarship 
should also be encouraged as both schools begin to study the latest crisis. Recent scholarship 
within the field of critical political economy indicates that these two schools may be diverging 
rather than synthesizing. Constructivist scholar Mark Blyth, for example, recently argued that 
“the world is much more deeply socially constructed than we think and rests upon foundations 
far more malleable and fleeting than materialist approaches assume” (Labrousse, 2008). Much 
like the structure-agency problem, the divisions and debates between constructivists and 
materialists are likely to endure, but the dialogue in itself is encouraging. These ongoing 
theoretical debates can only serve to enliven the field of critical political economy. 
Relevance Today 
The global recession that began in 2007 was structural in nature, given its depth, 
longevity and global character. State leaders are calling for a “decade of austerity” as the crisis 
continues to unfold (Times, 2012), and the organizational forms of global and national capital are 
in a period of flux and uncertainty. The evolution of monetary policy from the 1970s to present 
day has implications for how the global crisis of 2007 developed and its subsequent policy 
responses. 
One evident consequence of the monetary reforms that were introduced in the 1970s is an 
increasing level of global economic volatility. As political economist David McNally argues, the 
abandonment of fixed exchange rates in 1971 laid the “structural foundation of financialization 
and the liberalized and deregulated markets that accompany it” (2010: 91). The exponential 





speculative trading to flourish. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange created the International 
Money Market in 1972, allowing investors to speculate in currency futures (purchasing 
currencies at a set rate and time in the future); complex financial instruments including 
derivatives and default hedges also began to proliferate (ibid: 94). These are precisely the 
financial instruments that fostered a massive asset bubble in mortgage-backed securities, which 
was to burst in a spectacular way in 2007-08 (Gowan, 2009). 
The monetary policies introduced in the 1970s and 1980s also help explain why the 
Canadian economy faces an uncertain and volatile recovery today. The Canadian economy is on 
fragile ground because of record levels of household debt. Most media commentators argue that 
people were lulled into purchasing homes because interest rates were so low, and the Bank of 
Canada did indeed reduce interest rates to nearly zero in an effort to stimulate consumption and 
investment. However, this only tells part of the story. 
The sustained waves of high interest rates in the 1980s and 1990s effectively crippled 
Canadian manufacturing and industry because borrowing money to finance machinery and 
research and development became prohibitively expensive. Both the sharp increase in interest 
rates in the 1980s and again in the 1990s served to bring the Canadian economy to a standstill. 
These were deliberate recessions engineered by the central bank as a means of reducing the rate 
of inflation. Doing so, as policymakers knew, had the immediate consequence of significantly 
increasing the rate of unemployment. The subsequent lack of productive investment and 
consumption was overcome in two ways, as Gowan argues: “First and most important, the 
problem of stimulating consumer demand was tackled through the sustained supply of credit 
from the financial system. Secondly, cheap commodities could be bought on an endless basis 
from abroad—especially from China” (ibid: 25). This helps explain why the Canadian economy 





attributed to low interest rates that encouraged home ownership and credit-financed 
consumption. These debt levels were accumulated over time, fostered by high interest rates that 
drove people into debt and crippled manufacturing and industry in Canada.   
One final element worth stressing about present-day circumstances is the speculative 
nature of Canada’s economic climate. International investors are purchasing Canadian bonds 
because the country is perceived as a safe haven in the midst of global economic volatility. A 
significant portion of these investments are bonds backed by Canadian mortgages that are 
guaranteed by the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation. A report issued in March, 2012, 
notes that the CMHC’s “vulnerability to mortgage defaults has soared nine-fold in 20 years, 
nearing levels reached by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the U.S. at the height of the housing 
boom” (Gowan, 2009). The risk that Canadian homeowners will default on their mortgages is 
“significant,” according to National Bank Financial analyst, Peter Routledge (ibid). The point 
worth stressing is that monetary reforms and policies beginning in the 1970s contributed to these 
conditions of household indebtedness and economic volatility. The high interest rates introduced 























Source: Crawford, Allan and Umar Faruqui. 2012. “What Explains Trends in Household Debt in Canada?” 
Bank of Canada Review, Winter: 1-15. 
 
There is a notable decline in household debt following the easing of Volcker-era policies 
in the early 1980s followed by a clear rise in debt with the onset of the Crow Doctrine. Current 
household debt levels must therefore be put in historical context rather than isolating recent low 
interest rates as the primary factor. The systemic crisis of the 1970s and subsequent policy 
responses have profoundly shaped today’s global economic development and class 
configurations, to the extent that present circumstances and trajectories must be situated within 
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